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Abstract
The Kariba Dam, completed during the second half of the 1950s, was the rst main-
stream dam built on the Zambezi River. Its construction was partially nanced by the
largest loan that the World Bank had given up until that time. Considered a success-
ful project even by aected people based on cost benet analysis, Kariba also involved
unacceptable environmental and social impacts. The involuntary resettlement of 57,000
people within the reservoir basin and immediately downstream from the dam was re-
sponsible for serious environmental degradation which was one of a number of factors
that left a majority of those resettled impoverished. Other factors included inadequate
institutional capacity, inadequate opportunities, adverse rural-urban terms of trade, the
war for Zimbabwes independence and the bankruptcy of the political economy of Zambia.
Built as a single purpose hydro project, Karibas construction drastically altered, and
regularized, the Zambezis natural regime. That adversely aected the ood recession
agriculture of Zambian villagers living below the dam as well as the size and biodiversity
of the Zambezi delta and the productivity of Mozambiques oshore shery. Failure to
properly drawdown the Kariba and Cahora Bassa reservoirs prior to increased rainfall
during the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 rainy seasons caused signicant downstream loss of
life, crops, and village and urban infrastructure in February-March 2000 and 2001.
JEL classication numbers: 012, 015, 022, 033
Key words: Kariba Dam, resettlement, impoverishment, government policy, environmen-
tal degradation
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   The Kariba Case Study    
 
             Thayer Scudder 
 
Introduction 
 
Implemented in British Colonial Africa in the 1950s, the Kariba Dam project is an 
important case study for numerous reasons. It was the first mainstream dam on the 
Zambezi River. It was the first large dam financed by the World Bank and involved the 
Bank’s largest loan up until that time (Austin, 1968: 155). It was the first dam in the 
tropics and subtropics studied by independent researchers throughout the project cycle, 
with that research providing planners with important information and lessons. 
 
Considered a successful dam even by affected people based on conventional cost benefit 
analysis, Kariba also involved unacceptable environmental and social impacts. Especially 
unacceptable were adverse impacts on 57,000 resettlers and irreversible impacts on the 
delta and other wetlands of the Zambezi River. On the other hand, Kariba  produced a 
number of important benefits that warrant analysis and replication as well as important 
lessons that have yet to be adequately applied to more recent large dam projects. In the 
Zambian portion of the Kariba Lake Basin, examples include a successful reservoir 
fisheries program in which affected people were active participants and effective 
utilization of the reservoir’s extensive drawdown area. Implemented in the 1990s, another 
example includes the first reparations projects for attempting to offset at least some of the 
impoverishing aspects of the resettlement program. On the Zimbabwe side, the program 
has been pushed by the binational Zambezi River Authority and on Zambian side by the 
government’s electricity parastatal with funding from the World Bank and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa.  
 
Whether or not Kariba might have been an acceptable development option if World 
Commission on Dams decision making criteria and guidelines had been followed, is an 
interesting question. I would suspect that a decision on Kariba’s acceptability would have 
been deferred until after the construction of tributary dams within the Kafue Gorge had 
been built. If they, plus the existing and planned hydro stations at Victoria Falls which 
are run of the river installations with no reservoir formation, had met local energy needs 
until the formation of the Southern African Power Pool in the mid 1990s, Kariba might 
have remained an unacceptable option 
 
Following a description of the future reservoir basin and its inhabitants and an historical 
overview of the project, major benefits will be analyzed. These are power generation, 
tourism, reservoir fisheries, and utilization of the reservoir drawdown area. 
Environmental and downstream impacts will then be assessed followed by a detailed 
analysis of the resettlement process with a final section included on major lessons 
learned. 
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The Gwembe Valley and the Gwembe Tonga 
 
The Gwembe Valley Prior to Kariba 
 
For farmers like the Gwembe Tonga, the Gwembe Valley (hereafter the Valley) was a 
harsh, unforgiving environment. Hot, dry and dusty for much of the year, rainfall was low 
and irregular. Yet flooding was not uncommon. A wider variety of diseases were present 
than on the adjacent plateaus, including human sleeping sickness ( trypanosomiasis). 
Keeping of livestock in most of the Valley was constrained by animal trypanosomiasis  
carried by tsetse flies while a wide range of pests from armoured crickets and locusts to 
elephant and hippopotamus were a constant threat to crops.  On the other hand, the rich 
natural resource base, and especially the fertile alluvial soils along the Zambezi and its 
major tributaries, allowed population densities to build up to levels which were high by 
Central African standards. 
 
The Valley is best defined as that portion of the Middle Zambezi Valley in which the 
Gwembe Tonga are the dominant ethnic group. The upper half of the Middle Zambezi 
Valley, it begins where the Valley opens out below Victoria Falls and extends 230 miles 
downstream to the Zambezi-Kafue confluence (Figure 1). Contained within the southern 
portion of the African rift valley system, the Zambezi River is the dominant feature with 
the Valley itself lying several thousand feet below the adjacent north and south bank 
plateaus.   
 
A semi-arid habitat, temperatures are high, with the annual mean maximum hovering 
around 90°. The Gwembe Tonga identify four seasons. The rainy season generally begins 
in November-December and ends in March-April. It is followed by a cold season of 
several months duration which phases into the longer dry season which the Tonga divide 
into two periods. Extremely irregular from one location to another, and from one year to 
another, rainfall was marginal for the cultivation of maize and even for sorghum and 
bulrush millet during periodic years of drought.  
 
The most important arable soils were alluvial with their distribution along the Zambezi 
and the lower reaches and deltas of its  tributaries determining the distribution and 
density of the Gwembe Tonga. Though approximately two thirds of the surface area of 
the Valley was on the south bank, only one-third of the human population lived there 
because of smaller alluvial deposits. This was because more deeply incised tributaries 
entered the Zambezi up-dip owing to the river not flowing in the axis of the Middle 
Zambezi Valley syncline.  Younger alluvia could be cultivated twice annually with an 
initial planting at the commencement of the rains and a dry season planting following the 
withdrawal of the annual Zambezi flood that commenced between the end of February 
and the beginning of April.  Rarely flooded older alluvial soils could only be cultivated 
during the rainy season, and then required periodic fallowing. 
 
When crops failed, as they periodically did because of inadequate rainfall, inadequate or 
excessive and premature floods, or a combination of factors, death rates were known to 
applicable, as we shall see, are unexpected events and competition with hosts and 
exploitation by immigrants. 
 
Let me anticipate one criticism for using the Kariba case; namely that it played a major 
role in the origins of my four stage analytical framework and that I over-generalized 
certain characteristic and situational features of the Kariba case to DIDR elsewhere (see 
Partridge et al in Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). That was definitely the case.  One 
example was my emphasis on denial of forthcoming resettlement by those involved. 
Denial was there in the Gwembe Tonga case as it was in the Brazilian flavela studied by  
 
      Figure 1 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Resettlement Areas in Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Source: Adapted from a 1960 Map Drawn by A.D. Hastings 
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have increased in famine years during the first half of the 20th century. Thereafter 
villagers had a wider range of options including government-supplied famine relief and 
wage labor in the developing economies of the two Rhodesias. Two older coping 
measures remained important. One was leaving food deficit areas to visit kin with better 
harvests. The other was to rely more on the rich and varied natural resource base 
(Scudder, 1962 and 1971). During periods of hunger, for example, the Gwembe Tonga 
relied on harvesting a number of wild grasses that matured in February even before the 
people’s early maturing cereal staples. They also utilized a number of toxic seeds and 
tubers that required extensive preparation as well as practically ever type of animal that 
roamed the land, swam the rivers, or flew.  
 
The Gwembe Tonga before Kariba 
 
Before Kariba’s construction, the population estimate for the Gwembe Valley was 
approximately 85,000. Over 90 percent were Gwembe Tonga, as was a still larger 
proportion of those who eventually were resettled. In describing Gwembe Tonga society, 
my emphasis is on aspects which were most influenced by the people’s experiences with 
resettlement.  These include economic dependency on Zambezi and tributary alluvial 
soils which were inundated by Kariba Lake and strong social and religious identification 
with encompassing neighborhoods. Also included is subsequent community unraveling to 
which resettlement, along with national economic downturn, was a contributing factor. 
Especially significant were changes in belief systems whereby misfortunes of any sort 
came to be increasingly blamed on witchcraft. 
 
At the time of resettlement, religion was dominated by a form of ancestor worship 
whereby the welfare of an individual or an extended kin group was dependent on the 
goodwill and protection of recently deceased kin.  They were the primary instrument of 
social control. When misfortunes occurred those involved sought the services of diviners 
to learn the cause. In 1956-1957 my colleague Elizabeth Colson collected information on 
206 divinations. In 200 the cause of illness, death or other misfortune was attributed to 
ancestral displeasure at the failure of the living to behave in a culturally appropriate way. 
That might be defined as a failure of a man to complete his marriage payments, or of any 
individual to honor the ancestors through the pouring of libations. Other sources of 
misfortunate, including witchcraft, were rare.  
  
Varying in size from less than 100 to over 500 residents, permanent Gwembe Tonga 
villages were focused on alluvial deposits. Where such deposits were extensive as within 
Zambezi River meanders or in the deltas of the larger north bank tributaries, villages 
were larger. They were also more closely clustered in neighborhoods of three to seven 
villages, the neighborhood (cisi in the local language) being the largest indigenous 
political unit throughout the Gwembe Valley.  Two important characteristics of the 
Gwembe Tonga were their organization in matrilineal kin groups and their egalitarian 
character.  For social purposes descent was reckoned through women with all Tonga 
belonging to the lineage of their mother in which the authority figure in relationship to 
children, for example, was a woman’s brother as opposed to her husband. Such lineages 
consisted of the living, the dead, and the unborn and were multi-functional units.  The 
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responsible unit for dealing with the ancestors, the matrilineage was also the unit through 
which wives, land, livestock and other property, and positions and skills, were inherited. 
In former times, it was also the unit responsible for avenging a member’s death. 
 
Though matrilineal, the Tonga kinship system also had a patrilineal bias. Residence was 
virilocal, with newly married couples frequently living with the father or mother’s 
brother or other male matrilineal relative of the husband until marriage payments were 
complete. Then the goal of husbands would be to establish their own independent 
homestead in which to increase their dependents and their wealth in land resources and 
livestock by taking plural wives and attracting matrilineal kin. Within such homesteads 
the primary goals of wives was to increase their lineage’s size by having as many 
children as possible and advancing the interests of those children over those of co-wives 
or other dependents of their husbands. 
 
The egalitarian nature of Gwembe society was reflected in patterns of leadership where a 
series of checks and balances kept any single individual from gaining too much control 
over others. Prominent elders and political leaders had influence rather than authority, 
with Tonga males unwilling to accept decisions made unless they were present at the time 
and a consensus was reached. Checks and balances were especially evident in regard to 
religious leaders. Every neighborhood had a ritual leader. Usually a lineage descendent of 
the first man to pioneer agriculture within the area, his influence was tied to specific 
villages, fields and sacred zones in which small shrines were periodically renewed.  
 
Based on seasonal changes and discussion within the community, it was the 
neighborhood ritual leader, working with his wife, who must be the first to plant crops at 
the commencement of the rainy season as well as the first to initiate a range of 
agricultural activities - including brewing the first beer from the new harvest. He also 
must be the first to cut thatching grass as well as to initiate other natural resource 
activities such as fishing within sacred zones. Such prerogatives coordinated vital 
livelihood activities within a problem-prone environment and, in the case of sacred zones, 
managed resource extraction. On the other hand, the neighborhood leader did not have 
the authority to either name or punish offenders.  When the rains failed, or other 
unexpected events threatened livelihoods, villagers assembled to clap and dance at the 
residence of an acknowledged prophet. Usually a woman, she would then identify the 
problem’s cause and solution while in a trance.  Should the misbehavior of an individual 
be identified, such as initiating a prohibited activity before the ritual leader, that 
individual would be identified and required to pay a fine at the neighborhood shrine 
which people might be required to rebuild under the ritual leader’s direction.  
 
Other important customs of relevance to the resettlement process included a mechanism 
whereby a prominent individual could establish an institutionalized relationship of 
friendship (bulongwe) that would provide security to such important visitors as buyers 
and sellers of goods and services.  Possession dances (masabe) were especially important 
for women under stress in a male-dominated society. Their illnesses were apt to be 
diagnosed as due to possession by one of a number of dangerous or unfamiliar entities. 
Cure would require ritualized drumming and dancing paid for by kin, or an erring 
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husband, that allowed the one possessed to be treated while being the center of 
community attention.  
 
The primary production unit was the homestead and, within the homestead, each separate 
household. Where extra labor was needed for such activities as building a house or 
weeding a large field, one could call on assistance from close matrilineal relatives, 
although a more common practice was to solicit the help of neighbors with locally 
brewed beer as payment. Productive activities were varied so as to reduce risk. 
Agriculture was the most important activity with each family trying to gain access to 
fields with the necessary range of soils and moisture conditions needed for growing the 
three main cereal staples. Though bush gardens that required periodic fallowing had 
become important as population increased after the second world war, most valuable 
were the more fertile alluvial soils which could be cultivated twice annually without 
fallowing and where fresh, and highly prized, vegetables could be grown during the long 
and hot dry season. Both men and women could inherit arable land, with women, in 
particular, identifying their welfare with alluvial gardens that had been inherited from one 
generation of female kin to another. Also important was the keeping of livestock as well 
as gathering, fishing and hunting activities. During the dry season, a majority of men 
might be absent seeking wage labor on the farms and in the urban centers of the adjacent 
plateaus.   
 
The Kariba Dam Project: Historical Overview 
 
Introduction 
 
The history of the Kariba project between the 1950s and the present has been influenced 
by a number of unexpected events that make a difficult evaluation of effectiveness even 
more difficult.  These events include changes in governments as well as in the political 
economies of those governments. While such changes did not have a major impact on the 
first stage of the Kariba Project, they did impact upon the second stage which was 
delayed during the turbulent 1960s due to Rhodesia’s illegal unilateral declaration of 
independence in 1965 following Zambia’s independence in 1964. By the time that second 
stage was finally completed in 1975, Zambia’s demand for power had stagnated, 
increasing by only 2 percent between 1974 and 1980.  
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In 1980 Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe. Thereafter the inability of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe to agree on an equitable pricing arrangement, as well as Zimbabwe’s more 
rapid growth until recently and unreliable power supplies from Zambia, caused 
Zimbabwe to seek self-sufficiency through the construction of thermal stations powered 
by nearby coal deposits at Hwange (formerly Wankie). While economic downturn, 
exacerbated by the AIDS epidemic, currently characterizes both countries, in 1996 
Kariba became a key component of the South African initiated-Southern African Power 
Pool (SAPP) that eventually will link Southern, Central and Eastern Africa. Also in 1996 
the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) announced a rehabilitation program for those 
resettled in Zimbabwe over forty years ago, with the Zambia Electricity Supply 
Corporation (ZESCO) announcing a similar program in 1998 for north bank resettlers. 
 
History 
 
A bi-national project, Kariba was also the largest project implemented to date in both 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its history is important because decisions made had national 
significance for subsequent development. That is especially the case in Zambia where the 
way in which funds were obtained for Kariba’s construction precluded the 
implementation of a major rural development initiative that might have had a major 
impact on improving the living standards of the currently impoverished population.  
  
Serious planning for a major dam in the Zambezi Basin began in 1946 in what were then 
two British colonial territories. Its sole purpose would be to provide electricity to the 
Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt and the urban industrial centers of Southern Rhodesia. 
Already globally significant suppliers of copper, the Copperbelt’s major multinational 
mining firms had been undergoing rapid development since the end of the Second World 
War.  Lack of a reliable, low cost supply of electricity was seen not just as a major 
constraint for further development, but as a crisis in the making.  Between 1948 and 1956 
coal delivered from Wankie to Copperbelt power stations over an inadequate single-track 
railway line had to be supplemented by fuelwood that deforested 917 square kilometers 
in the surrounding areas (Williams, 1985: 48). Energy supplies were complemented in 
1956 by temporarily importing electricity from the Belgian Congo to the north – a 
strategy seen at only temporary because of civil strife (Soils Inc.2000: 9). 
 
During the 1946-53 planning period two dam sites received serious consideration. One 
was the Kariba Gorge in the Middle Zambezi Valley; the other was immediately 
upstream from the Kafue River Gorge on a Zambezi tributary entirely contained within 
Northern Rhodesia. Established in 1946, the Inter-Territorial Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission appointed an Advisory Panel in 1948 to choose between the two sites. When 
the Panel initially favored Kariba, the Northern Rhodesia government (NRG) objected 
and asked the Panel to look more carefully at the Kafue site. Involving a smaller, less 
expensive dam, NRG argued that Kafue could provide the critically needed power to the 
Copperbelt at an earlier date than Kariba. Presumably NRG was also influenced by its 
white settler community that emphasized that Copperbelt needs should be met by a 
territorial dam as opposed to a shared one, 
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After the Panel confirmed that Kafue could provide sufficient cheap power more rapidly 
that Kariba, the Northern Rhodesian settler-dominated legislature voted in 1953 to 
proceed with Kafue. A Kafue River Hydroelectric Authority was established as the 
responsible agency. That same year the two territories were joined with Nyasaland to 
form the Central African Federation.  Though short-lived (1953 – 1963), creation of the 
Southern Rhodesian-dominated Federation shifted the emphasis back to Kariba since its 
Prime Minister favored the Kariba site for political as well as economic reasons: Kariba 
would fuse the two Rhodesias by an “arch of  concrete” across the Zambezi (ibid: 142; 
see also Williams 1985: 49).  
 
After the newly formed Federal Hydro-Electric Broad had replaced the Inter-Territorial 
Power Commission in 1954, an advisory panel of  experts supplied by the French 
parastatal Electricité de France was asked to further assess the two sites.  Once again the 
Kariba site was favored, as it was by a second 1954 report by a distinguished French 
engineer. Dealing only with electricity generation, neither report included such issues as 
irrigation or resettlement in spite of the fact that Kariba would require the removal of 
thousands of people while a Kafue reservoir would displace only a few households at 
most.  
 
The two French reports decided the issue in December 1954. Kariba would be built first  
and Kafue second.  A Federal Power Board was established, with a project document  
submitted, in what must be close to record time, in December 1955. The next year cost  
estimates were increased from ₤54 million to ₤80 million due partially to cost  
accounting, selection of a better site for the dam in the Kariba Gorge and the decision 
to heighten it by six meters. Because of an increasing demand for energy on both the  
Copperbelt and within Southern Rhodesia, the same rigid time table was maintained for  
project completion in1960. That left inadequate time for planning and implementing an  
acceptable resettlement program. Rather the resettlement of 57,000 people became a  
crash program to physically remove them before the reservoir began to fill. 
 
The problem of finding extra finance remained. To solve that the Federal Prime 
Minister requested the multinational copper companies to loan the Federation the 
necessary finance. That required them to make a choice since the Northern Rhodesian 
Governor had also requested a loan for a major rural development program that was 
intended to reverse rural migration to the Copperbelt and the urban centers along the line 
of rail. Denying the Northern Rhodesia rural development request, and a similar request 
from Nyasaland, the copper companies opted for funding Kariba. That decision, 
according to the World Commission on Dams’ Kariba Dam Case Study, ended not just 
Northern Rhodesia’s best option for a major rural development program but also 
Zambia’s (Soils Inc. 2000: 142-143).  Final funding included a ₤28.6 million loan from 
the World Bank, ₤28 million obtained from the mining companies and Barclays and 
Standard Banks, and ₤15 million from the Commonwealth Development Corporation. 
 
Even before financing had been received from the World Bank, construction began in 
1956 with the dam wall sealed at the beginning of the rainy season in December 1958.  
During the first two months water levels rose over 30 meters above normal levels 
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flooding now deserted villages in the process. On reaching full storage capacity in 1963, 
the Kariba reservoir became the world’s largest. 280 kilometers long, Kariba Lake 
flooded over 3,000 square kilometers of riverine forests and inland savanna woodland. 
 
In the first half of the 1960s unexpected political events occurred. The Central African 
Federation broke up in 1963 when Nyasaland became the independent country of 
Malawi. In October 1964 Northern Rhodesia became independent Zambia. In 1965 the 
settler government of Southern Rhodesia became Rhodesia by unilaterally (and illegally) 
declaring its independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom (UK). Though the United 
Kingdom had created a Central African Power Corporation (CAPCO) at the Federation’s 
termination to take over the functions, staff and assets of the Federal Power Board and a 
Higher Authority for Power to approve major policy decisions, after UDI  Zambia 
refused to accept the legality of the Rhodesian representatives. That brought decision-
making to a standstill until UK, which legally was still the government of what had been 
Southern Rhodesia, appointed two members to represent south bank interests on the 
Higher Authority.  
 
Because of such delays, the construction of Kariba Stage 2 was delayed until the 1970s. 
To protect itself from Stage 1 installations being in Rhodesia, the Government of Zambia 
(GRZ) had proceeded, in the meanwhile, with two other hydro-electric schemes. One, 
generating 100 MW, was on the north bank of the Zambezi near Victoria Falls. The other 
was the 600 MW Kafue Project that was commissioned in 1971. The previous year GRZ 
planning for the 615 MW Stage 2 got underway with the formation of the Kariba North 
Bank Company that appointed CAPCO as the project authority. With a loan from the 
World Bank, the Project was completed in 1977 after a two-year delay because of 
geological problems and the bankruptcy of the initial civil engineering contractor.  
 
Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, cooperation between the two governments 
failed to improve. In Zambia, the authorities believed that the Kariba project was yielding 
more benefits to Zimbabwe. Because CAPCO bought electricity at cost, including that 
generated in Zambia with funds independent of CAPCO’s, profit from Zambia’s major 
energy investments went to an organization that not only allocated significantly more 
joint revenue for extending the transmission system in Zimbabwe than in Zambia but also 
sold more electricity to Zimbabwe from joint facilities due to that country’s higher 
growth rate during the 1980s. Such problems led to CAPCO being replaced in 1988 by 
the Zambezi River Authority with a more restricted mandate.  Though still responsible 
for running the Kariba facilities and for planning and implementing additional dams on 
the Zambezi, the distribution of power as well as budgetary authority had been handed 
over to the appropriate ministries in the two countries.  
 
Pricing and other disagreements also interfered with decision-making relating to other 
binational dams. Though feasibility studies have been underway in Zimbabwe for a dam 
in the Middle Zambezi’s Batoka Gorge below Victoria Falls, Zambia’s agreement has not 
been forthcoming. Rather both countries have been pursuing “go-it-alone” policies with 
Zambia initiating a second stage dam on the lower Kafue and augmenting the capacity of 
the Victoria Falls hydro station and Zimbabwe developing large-scale, Hwange coal-fired 
 8 
thermal plants. The only major cooperative venture, and a multinational one at that, has 
been Kariba’s incorporation in the Southern African Power Pool, which will eventually 
provide an important linkage with increased power production from the Congo River. 
 
 
 
Major Benefits 
 
Generation of Electricity 
 
In evaluating the development effectiveness of the Kariba project, it is important to keep 
in mind the growing energy crisis on the Copperbelt during the 1950s, Zambia’s 
increasing demand for energy between 1964 and 1974, and Zimbabwe’s after 1980. It is 
also important to emphasize that Kariba was not just designed to bring least cost energy 
to the urban and industrial sectors of two countries, but was also planned as part of an 
ongoing process of energy development that continues up until this day. Stage1 
construction in the 1950s brought on line a maximum capacity of 705 megawatts (MW) 
provided by six turbines located on the south bank of the Zambezi. Stage 2 followed in 
the 1970s with four north bank turbines that brought total capacity to 1320 MW. 
 
Though underutilized at times in Zambia, with irregular north bank transmission to 
Zimbabwe because of ongoing pricing and other disagreements, Kariba power is still 
cheap in comparison to other sources. That statement even applies to Stage 2 electricity 
where cost overruns, among other factors, have reduced an expected rate of return of 17% 
to 8.9% (World Bank 1983: ii). For example, “the average electricity cost in the region 
dropped by about 30% in the period 1961-1977, while the average price for other 
commodities and services rose by more than 75%” (Soils Inc., 2000: v).  Direct 
beneficiaries were the mining industries and other industries in both countries as well as 
their employees. Zimbabwe in particular was able to develop a wider range of electricity-
intensive industries including fertilizer production.  Governments also benefited, with 
over 80% of Zambia’s foreign exchange coming from copper from the second half of the 
1960s until the end of the 1980s.  
 
While the Kariba case study also includes millions of consumers as beneficiaries among a 
rapidly increasing urban population, in Lusaka as well as other urban centers up to half of 
that population still lives in poorly electrified peri-urban settlements.  As for the Gwembe 
Tonga, their district councils (aside from those based in Kariba and Siavonga Townships 
on either side of the dam), schools and clinics only began to receive electricity in the 
1990s when Binga was connected to the national grid in Zimbabwe and the Lusitu area 
and services in and around Sinazongwe town were connected in Zambia. 
 
Fisheries 
 
Introduction 
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Yet to be extensively applied elsewhere, a major lesson from Kariba concerns the 
fisheries potential that dam reservoirs have for subsistence and commercial fishing by 
immigrants and local residents, and for recreational fishing. Immigrants are noted first in 
the preceding sentence since they, like the urban users of Kariba’s electricity, were the 
main beneficiaries at the expense of local residents. A partial exception was the 
successful development of an inshore, artisanal fishery on the Zambian side that provided 
substantial benefits to thousands of resettlers and hosts, and has major implications for 
large dams elsewhere. 
 
What was known about the fish populations of the Middle Zambezi prior to Kariba’s 
completion was largely restricted to the indigenous knowledge of the Gwembe Tonga. 
Though the depth and speed of water in the river’s primary channel restricted the 
artisanal fishery to the river’s edge and flood plains and to tributaries, the Tonga knew 
most of the species by name and caught them with a wide range of techniques including 
valved and valveless baskets, traps, spears and poisons (Scudder, 1960).  An important 
source of protein, fishing also had recreational and ritual characteristics. 
 
I believe the first scientific sampling of the river was in 1956. Present at that time, I  was 
surprised one afternoon to hear explosions coming from the river. On investigating, I 
found members of the Joint Fisheries Research Organization of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
throwing dynamite into the river. Stunned fish were then scoped up for identification. 
Using such techniques, what was assumed to be an undercount of 28 species were 
identified (Jackson, 1960).   
 
Though the Federal Power Board’s interest was restricted to electricity generation, 
interest in the reservoir basin within the Federation and the two territories led to the 
creation of a Kariba Lake Committee (KLC) in 1955. That evolved into the Kariba Lake 
Coordinating Committee in 1957 with two members appointed from the territorial and 
federal governments. One of the KLC’s first acts was to form a Kariba Lake Fisheries 
Committee to “examine and report on the industrial, subsistence and recreational fishing 
potentialities of the Lake.” 1 In addition to government fisheries officials, C.F. Hickling, 
then Fisheries Adviser for the Colonies to the UK Colonial Office, was asked to estimate 
the fisheries potential of the future reservoir. His and other estimates ranged from 14,000 
to 22,000 tons without the stocking of exotics. Those were heady figures that the 
authorities rounded off as 20,000 tons – a figure that took on an almost magical quality. 
While that figure proved to be a major over-estimate until stocking occurred in the mid-
1960s, its impact was favorable since it led to policies and finance for fisheries 
development.  
 
A characteristic of all man-made reservoirs is an initial explosion of primary and 
secondary productivity following impoundment due to a release of nutrients from flooded 
soil and vegetation. In the Kariba case nutrient content as measured by total dissolved 
solids increased from a pre-project 26 parts per million (ppm) to 65 ppm by 1963 and 
                                                 
1 1951 Annual Report of the Central African Council on the Kariba/Kafue Hydro-Electric Power 
Committee (from Soils Inc, 2000: viii)  
 
 10 
dropping to 42 ppm after 1964-65 (Balon 1974: 139). During the 1959-1963 period, not 
only did commercial species of fish such as tilapia find an ample food supply and 
exceptional breeding conditions, but such predators as tiger fish (Hydrocynus vittatus) 
and crocodiles, which had dominated the Zambezi’s primary channel, were spread over a 
much wider area. Resident species also increased from 28 before Kariba to 41, of which 
13 were “economically preferred species” in the artisanal fishery (ibid: 14). 
 
Because such a rapid initial increase in productivity can be expected to be short lived as 
nutrient levels decline and predators extend their range, a commercial fishery must be 
available to exploit it from the start; otherwise natural mortality will reap the harvest. By 
the time the reservoir reached full storage level in 1963, over 2,000 Gwembe Tonga 
fishermen on the North Bank were landing between 3,000 to 4,000 tons per annum, with 
total reservoir landings estimated at about 7,000 tons per annum. Already, however, 
productivity was decreasing, with yields of 40 pounds per 100 yards of netting dropping 
to less than 30 pounds in 1963 and 20 pounds in 1967 by which time total landings had 
fallen to less than 1,000 tons. Though the war for Zimbabwe’s Independence restricted 
fishing activities throughout the 1970s, since 1980 total reservoir landing have gradually 
increased to about 5,000 tons in the late 1980s. Thereafter they fell again as reservoir 
levels dropped until 1999 when heavy rains once again brought the reservoir to full 
storage level. 
 
A deep reservoir, it was expected that the indigenous fish population would be restricted 
to the reservoir littoral. When the question arose of stocking Kariba Lake with exotic 
species to colonize the open and deeper waters, Hickling and other experts recommended 
a “wait and see” approach. The first stocking attempt occurred between 1959 and 1961, 
when north bank fisheries officials attempted, with little success, to increase the inshore 
tilapia catch by introducing 26 tons of fingerlings.  Further stocking was postponed until 
a FAO/UNDP/Federation Central African Fisheries Research Institute (CFRI) was 
established in 1963 as one of several such research institutions serving African man-made 
lakes. Under CFRI supervision, a small sardine like fish, Limnothrissa miodon (called 
kapenta locally) was introduced from Lake Tanganyika on the Zambian side.  
 
Initial follow-up investigations indicated that the introduction had failed. What had 
happened, however, was that the introduced fish had left nutrient-poor Zambian waters 
for the Sanyati Basin on the Southern Rhodesian side where waters had been enriched by 
fertilizers entering the reservoir from large commercial farms in the hinterland. Not 
known until after Rhodesia’s UDI, that discovery caused an uproar in Zambia’s 
parliament as MPs raged about the loss of Zambian fish, with one MP urging that a net 
divide the waters between the two countries in order to keep Zambian fish where they 
belonged. The story ended happily, however, as kapenta not only gradually colonized the 
entire reservoir but also swam downstream to do the same in Mozambique’s Cahora 
Bassa reservoir. By 1985, total Lake Kariba kapenta landings exceeded 20,000 tons per 
annum. Zimbabwe remains the main beneficiary with approximately two-thirds of the 
catch. 
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Immigrant-dominated Commercial Fishing 
 
From its mid-1950s initiation, the primary interest of the Kariba Lake Coordinating 
Committee (KLCC) was to establish a Kariba Lake Development Company to exploit the 
reservoir’s fisheries potential. Each of the three governments was to provide capital of a 
million pounds as was the Colonial Development Corporation. The Company never 
materialized due to differences in opinion as to the Company’s primary purpose and who 
was to do the fishing. Believing that the Company should foster the greatest economic 
interests of the partners, the Southern Rhodesian and Federation governments favored an 
expatriate dominated fishery as did such Northern Rhodesian interests as the Industrial 
Development Corporation. Though the Northern Rhodesian Government initially favored 
the Company idea, they also insisted that the primary beneficiaries should be the African 
population. And because of the magnitude of resettlement, that population initially should  
be restricted to the residents of the Gwembe Valley. Moreover, NRG insisted that the 
Company’s formation required the approval of the Gwembe Tonga’s District Council.   
 
This is the first case that I am aware of where affected people were given the option of 
deciding how a major dam-related opportunity affecting their welfare should be 
structured.  In a March 10, 1960 letter the District Council rejected the Company idea, 
stating “We completely refuse to have such a company in our Native Reserve and in 
Native Trust Lands for the following reasons: (a) we shall not allow a Southern 
Rhodesian Government to have a say in our District;…(b) we have no faith in the Federal 
Government to control the water in our Native Reserve in the form of a company… In 
conclusion we want direct contact between this Native Authority and the Northern 
Rhodesian Government in all dealings in the matters of controlling the lake.” That 
brought an end to planning for an international organization to deal with issues other than 
power generation. It also brought an end to international planning for the reservoir until 
the 1990s when a Scandinavian-funded project led to coordinated planning that is still 
under way for the artisanal fishery (Malasha 1999 and 2003). 
 
Following the demise of the company idea, the development of the south bank fisheries 
potential was largely entrusted to Irvin and Johnson - a major South African Firm with 
both marine and fresh water interests. Allocated concession areas, this firm also 
purchased fresh fish from resettler and host fishers who were established in a number of 
camps where they were expected to become full-time fishers. Though the Southern 
Rhodesian Government stated that it wished to professionalize them, “no serious program 
was developed towards this end” (Bourdillon et al 1985: 21). Rather, due to various 
constraints that created a “sense of uncertainty,” the artisanal fishery came to be seen as 
“a tenuous and uncertain enterprise” (ibid: 22) which was exacerbated by the war years 
with the number of active fishers dropping “to about 130-140 in 1977” (Marshall et al 
1982: 189).  
 
A major constraint for south bank villagers that continues today was the prohibition 
against agriculture in the vicinity of fish camps. To reduce risks in a difficult 
environment, the Gwembe Tonga practice a diversified system of production in which 
agriculture and livestock management are the most important components. Rather than 
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becoming full-time fishers according to government’s plan, most occupants responded to 
this prohibition by leaving the camps during the rainy season to cultivate fields back in 
their villages. After Zimbabwe’s 1980 independence, the artisanal fishery began a 
recovery similar to that on the North Bank with the major difference that Irvin and 
Johnston continued to have a number of concession areas. By 1983, Bourdillon and 
colleagues estimate that there were 555 inshore fishers plus another 88 based on three 
Irvin and Johnson camps (ibid:156). 
 
The large scale, open water, kapenta fishery began in the Sanyati Basin when the then 
University of Rhodesia-affiliated Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute “discovered” 
kapenta two years after their introduction in Zambian waters (ibid: 26). Thereafter, the 
Institute experimented with various capture techniques, with the first firm licensed to fish 
kapenta on a commercial scale between 1973 and 1975. Thereafter additional licenses 
were issued, with an estimated 380 kapenta rigs operating on the reservoir in recent years 
(Soils Inc, 2000: 102). 
 
Whereas Kariba Lake provides only a relatively small proportion of Zambia’s inland 
fishery, its importance to Zimbabwe is much greater. According to Marshall et al (1982 
and 1985) by the mid 1980s kapenta not only comprised over 90% of Zimbabwe’s wet 
fish catch in Lake Kariba, but also two-thirds of Zimbabwe’s total fish catch. It is hard to 
overemphasize the importance of the kapenta fishery that has increased Kariba’s catch 
from 5.6 kg/ha in 1968-1969 to over 30 kg/ha in 1986 (Fernando and Holick, 1991). By 
then total landings exceeded 20,000 tons per annum. They rose to a highpoint of 28,726 
tons in 1990.  
 
With the exception of several kapenta rigs owned by the Zambia NGO Harvest 
Help/Zambia which are rented out to a European operator and rigs owned by the Binga 
District Council, all remaining kapenta operators are better capitalized immigrants. 
Though that restricts local benefits to male workers’ wages on kapenta rigs and largely 
female workers who dry the catch, those wages are provided by what is probably the 
most important single source of employment outside of village agriculture in the Kariba 
Lake Basin today. Though inadequate to move workers beyond subsistence, in the 
downward spiraling political economies of both Zambia and Zimbabwe, with their high 
unemployment rates, they play an important role in helping people survive. There is one 
major exception. According to Malasha’s sources (2001:4), before landing their yield 
after a night’s fishing, kapenta rig crews may illegally sell 30 to 60 percent of their catch 
to traders involved in the artisanal fishery. In an effort to reduce such loses, some kapenta 
operators have designed incentive systems whereby rig captains and crews are paid 
according to the amount of fish landed.  
 
The North Bank Artisanal Fisheries 
 
While Southern Rhodesian officials were primarily interested in a capital intensive, 
expatriate-dominated commercial fisheries, the Northern Rhodesian emphasis was on an 
artisanal fishery that would be restricted to the resettler and host population within the 
Gwembe Valley.  This difference in orientation was a result of the different political 
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economies of the two territories. Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing colony, which, 
like the federal government, was dominated by the white settler community. Northern 
Rhodesia was a Protectorate under close control from the Colonial Office in London that 
insisted that implementation of the Kariba Project not ignore the interests of the Gwembe 
Tonga. This viewpoint was shared by the relevant Southern Province and Gwembe 
District colonial officials. What followed was a well-planned and implemented artisanal 
or inshore fishery, with features that are transferable to other reservoirs in the tropics and 
subtropics. 
 
Even before the dam was built, the District Commissioner distributed gill nets to schools 
and select individuals with training provided by the Department of Game and Fisheries. I 
received one of those nets in 1957 prior to the record March flood which created 
favorable conditions for gillnet fishing within the Zambezi floodplain and tributary 
deltas. Young men in the village in which I lived were eager learners who soon could use 
gillnets from dugout canoes and carry out the necessary maintenance. As the reservoir 
began to fill during 1959, the first resettler and host fishers were already at work, with the 
first government survey that August reporting 407 fishers using 748 gillnets and 93 boats 
of which 87 were dugouts. 
 
The opportunity provided by a commercial artisanal fishery was greatly facilitated by 
government assistance. Starting in 1959, standardized equipment was sold through the 
offices of the Gwembe District administration until handed over to two local cooperatives 
that government initiative had established in the Lusitu area below the dam and in 
Sinazongwe two-thirds of the way up the reservoir. During 1960 that coop sold 100 
gillnets with the number rising to almost 1,000 during 1961. When increasingly 
sophisticated Tonga fisherman began to complain about inadequate inventory, the 
District Council complemented the coops with licensed private traders. Also during 1961 
a fisheries training center was opened at Sinazongwe that offered short courses and 
included a section for building improved boats. During 1962, 330 Tonga fishermen 
(nearly 15 % of those fishing north bank waters at the time) attended courses the length 
of which was increased from two to four weeks. 
 
A successful credit program with a repayment rate of over 90% was also introduced to 
cover the cost of nets and boats. By the beginning of 1963 over 2,000 local fishers were 
using over 5,000 gillnets. Though the number of boats was never accurately counted, 
approximately one-third were of improved plank and metal construction. Earned before 
landings began to drop in the mid-1960s, rising per capita income from fishing provided 
the main source of capital that allowed hundreds of resettler and host households to invest 
in the education of their children and in a wider range of economic activities including 
shops, tea rooms and beer halls and the mixed farming of cotton and other cash crops.  
By the time the artisanal fishery was opened to all comers after Zambia’s 1964 
independence, the major income earning opportunity was over for all but a small 
minority.  Even that ended during the war years of the 1970s. Since 1980, the fishery has 
been slowly recovering though it remains primarily a subsistence opportunity for most 
fishers, at least half of whom are immigrants trying to survive the serious recession that 
has characterized the Zambian economy since the mid-1970s.  
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Tourism 
 
Introduction 
 
As with fisheries, tourism did not feature in the planning documents of the Federal Power 
Board and the World Bank. Nor did the Kariba Lake Coordinating Committee give 
tourism the same attention that was given to fisheries. What development has occurred 
since – and it has been considerable – has largely been on an ad hoc basis by 
entrepreneurs in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. Aside from backward linkages to suppliers, 
benefits have largely gone to those entrepreneurs and the central governments.  
 
Benefits Accruing to Resettlers and Hosts 
 
As far as resettlers and hosts are concerned, a strong argument can be made that tourism’s 
impact on them has been largely negative. This is because of unequal competition for 
what were communal lands on both sides of the Zambezi prior to Kariba’s construction. 
On the Zimbabwe side, the entire lakeshore frontage extending 5 km. inland was 
incorporated within a recreational area that includes three national parks and 
concessionaire areas for safari operators. Most of the 23,000 resettlers were moved a 
substantial distance inland to the base of the escarpment. The principal exception is the 
series of carefully regulated sites for local fishers. Even where a minority of villagers 
lives closer to the reservoir as in Chief Mola’s area in Kariba District and in parts of 
Binga District, no cultivation in the drawdown area or immediately behind full storage 
level is allowed. 
 
In Zambia, the land grab by outsiders came later. There the Gwembe Tonga not only 
maintained communal ownership, but negotiated through their district council in the 
1950s the right for resettlers and hosts to leave resettlement sites, if they so wished, to 
settle along and utilize the edge of the entire reservoir.  Many did so with the result that 
today hamlets and villages are scattered along the edge of the reservoir from one end to 
another.  Where land has been lost, two forces have operated – one national and one 
local. At the national level lands have been excised for state farms, townships and 
Zambia’s soul source of commercial coal at Maamba.  At the local level, some outside 
entrepreneurs have bribed local chiefs to give them choice pieces of lakeshore frontage 
for tourism and other commercial activities while others have obtained island leases from 
district councils for the development of safari camps.  
 
The most spectacular piece of lakeshore frontage is the Kota Kota peninsula where the 
highest mountain in the Gwembe Valley descends to the edge of the reservoir. That was 
given to an expatriate who used paramilitary troops to drive the resident population of 
Tonga fishers and farmers from the area, causing the death of at least one. He then fenced 
off the neck of the peninsula and stocked the area with game including elephants that 
periodically swims across to local villages where they forage in cropland.  Further down 
the lake, another bribed Chief allocated the land of several villages and a non 
governmental agency (NGO) to another expatriate. That land grab failed only because the 
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NGO’s officials rallied the affected headman to confront the chief and to force him to 
rescind the agreement.  
 
The risk of such land grabs continues today. According to the April 2000 final report of 
Soil Inc’s Kariba Case Study “recently, some 4,600 hectares of land was alienated to 
about 40 foreign investors in Siavonga’s chieftaincy of Simamba” (page 37). Meanwhile 
safari operators continue to lease islands from the Sinazongwe District Council that cease 
to be available for use by fishers. No joint ventures yet exist between tourist 
entrepreneurs and local villagers and their local governments. Unlike the situation in 
Zimbabwe where a rapid build up of tourism at least has provided a market for local 
crafts and where safari operators under the CAMPFIRE program share some revenue 
with local councils, few benefits accrue to the Gwembe Tonga aside from the wages of 
the few who are employed in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in hotels and safari 
operations. 
 
Benefits Accruing to Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Central Government  
 
Tourism has developed much faster on the Zimbabwe side of Lake Kariba simply 
because the dam construction township was sited there. To accommodate a labor force 
that had grown to 8,000 workers by December 1956 (Webster 1975: 76), housing was 
built on flat land close to the dam site, while housing for the project authority and the 
main contractors was built at the top of an adjacent hill. While no similar development 
occurred on the north bank until Kariba North Bank Stage 2 began in the 1970s, schools, 
a hospital, a bank, a club for senior staff, shops, and a large Catholic church (which 
commemorates approximately 100 workers who died during construction) were quickly 
added. Kariba Township’s population now numbers approximately 25,000. 
 
Tourism began to grow slowly after a commercial airport was opened toward the end of 
1958. Conducted tours of the dam facilities began “in March 1962 attracting 10,000 
visitors and by 1965 there were over 35,000 people [who] visited the power station per 
year” (Soils Inc, 2000: 99).  Because of world-class scenery and facilities, international 
tourism made a major contribution with tourists combining visits to Victoria Falls, Kariba 
Dam and outlying Zimbabwe safari camps and hotels which were accessible by small 
aircraft and by boat. By 2000 the authors of the Kariba Case Study estimate that there 
were 4,000 boats operating on the reservoir including 1,500 houseboats and other 
pleasure craft operating from several marinas – all of which were on the south bank (page 
102). Game viewing and recreational fishing were of international quality. Elephant, 
buffalo and other game graze the grasslands that colonized Lake Kariba’s drawdown 
area.  The presence of tiger fish provides the basis for a well-attended annual tournament.  
 
In and around Kariba Township, 7 hotels were built with an estimated value ranging from 
1 to 12 million dollars. Counting outlying lodges, total hotel capacity on the Zimbabwe 
side in 2000 was 706 beds, with the number of visitors ranging from 6,000 to 12,000 a 
month depending on season (ibid: 103). Citing Zimbabwe Tourist Authority figures, 
receipts from all in-country tourist activities within the Middle Zambezi Valley, which 
would include canoe tourism, safari operations, and the Mana Pool national park below 
 16 
the dam, were estimated to be $35 million per annum (ibid: 103).   Though hotels at 
Siavonga on the North Bank have become a popular site for Zambian government and 
other conferences and workshops, it is unlikely that they will be able to attract a 
significant number of international tourists. While some of the safari operators leasing 
islands further up the reservoir in Zambian waters may do better, the absence of game 
viewing areas will continue to be a drawback. That brings up again the tragedy of Kota 
Kota Peninsula. Now the private reserve of a reclusive expatriate, that area could have 
become a gem of a national park that, with careful planning as a joint venture between 
the District Council and the National Park Service, could have provided important 
benefits to the Gwembe Tonga and the government.  
 
The Reservoir Drawdown Zone 
 
Prior to Kariba’s construction, the distribution and density of the 57,000 people who were 
subsequently resettled was determined by the availability of fertile alluvial soils along the 
banks of the Zambezi and the lower reaches of its major tributaries. When the people 
were resettled the large majority were moved inland to much less fertile Karroo 
sediments that could be cultivated only once annually if rains were sufficient and which 
also required periodic fallowing. The Gwembe Tonga situation is characteristic of most 
farming populations that must resettle because of large dam construction. That is a major 
reason why new opportunities are so crutial if people are to benefit from the resettlement 
process. Requiring less change for the majority than either commercial fishing or 
irrigation, utilization of the reservoir drawdown area is a seldom utilized option which 
requires much more consideration by planners. Reasons for its exclusion vary from 
ignorance on the part of project authorities to allocating it to different users or restricting 
access due to water quality concerns.  On the south bank, for example, the entire reservoir 
foreshore was set aside as a national recreational area at the expense of the Gwembe 
Tonga. Currently in Swaziland the desire of the project authorities is to fence off the 
Maguga reservoir from the local people for irrational water quality fears relating to a 
medium sized reservoir whose waters are to be used primarily for downstream irrigation.  
 
Fortunately for the Gwembe Tonga living on the north bank, their local council had 
negotiated with the colonial government that resettlers and hosts could occupy the edges 
of the reservoir and utilize its drawdown area once Kariba Lake reached full storage 
level.  In most years reservoir levels begin to drawdown in June-July, remaining down 
until after substantial inflows begin after the commencement of the rainy season in 
November-December. That gives at least four to five months during which crops can be 
grown in the upper drawdown zones that are more than sufficient to grow early maturing 
maize and horticultural crops.  While the growing season was longer prior to reservoir 
formation when it began with the March-April withdrawal of Zambezi floodwaters, 
otherwise no major change in production techniques or crops is required. As expected the 
Gwembe Tonga responded rapidly to the opportunity offered. That was true even on the 
South Bank where Tonga in Binga District risk arrest by cropping the drawdown area 
within the prohibited national recreation zone (communication from Susan Langely).  
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Though the extent of the drawdown area varies from year to year, the area that can be 
utilized for agriculture and grazing is extensive. That is especially the case on the north 
bank for the same reasons that pre-dam alluvial deposits there were the most extensive. 
Within several years of Kariba Lake’s formation, most of the drawdown area was 
colonized by an extensive sward of Pannicum repens – a very nutritious grass for 
domestic stock on the Zambian foreshore and such wildlife as elephant, buffalo and 
antelope on the Zimbabwe side. Realizing that they have access to one of the best and 
healthiest (due to initial absence of liver fluke) grazing areas in the country, resettlers 
used fishing profits and other funds from the early 1960s to build up herds of cattle with 
oxen then used for the plow cultivation of cotton and other cash crops.  
 
The WCD Kariba Case Study estimated the area available for drawdown cultivation on 
the north bank to be approximately 2,450 hectares, over half of which was available in 
the upper third of the reservoir basin (Soils Inc. 2000: 59). While I consider that an 
under-estimate, it is still a significant area of arable land that has played an important role 
in helping the Gwembe Tonga survive a seriously flawed resettlement program. That has 
been the case especially during the increasingly frequent drought years that characterized 
Central Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. Then the drawdown areas became even more 
extensive when reservoir levels fell significantly between the 1981/82-1998/99 seasons 
when Zambezi flows were only half of what they had been during the previous two 
generations.  
 
In recent years more and more households have moved down to the edge of the reservoir 
to cultivate the drawdown area, graze and water their cattle and other livestock, and fish. 
Though much garden land was lost, as were crops, with the return of the reservoir to full 
storage level due to heavy rainfall during the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 seasons, the 
importance of the drawdown area for cultivation and grazing remains. That importance 
could be significantly improved in two ways. One would require formulation of a simple 
hydrological model that would allow the government annually to advise farmers when 
drawdown could reliably be expected to begin and to experiment with potential food and 
cash crops for the drawdown area. The other would involve two types of zoning. The first 
would legalize Gwembe Tonga communal ownership to the drawdown area so as to 
restrict its privatization by both immigrant entrepreneurs and local elite. The second, 
within each village area, would zone the land for agriculture and grazing and in some 
areas perhaps for joint ventures with the private sector for tourism and game 
management. Such joint ventures have made a contribution to the Gwembe Tonga in 
Zimbabwe as a component of that country’s Communal Areas Management Program for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).  
 
The CAMPFIRE concept (Martin 1986) was pioneered in the Gwembe Valley’s 
Nyaminyami District in the 1980s, the idea being to share revenue from game 
management, safari hunting, and tourism in communal areas with local people. Now 
operating in over twenty districts, results vary from one area to another. A major lesson 
learned over the years has been to decentralize management below the district council 
level as much as possible so as to spread benefits more equitably. Benefits in the 
Gwembe Valley include improved social services at community centers as well as some 
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cash income at the household level. On the other hand, procedures for equitably 
benefiting those villagers whose personal safety and fields are most at risk from big game 
concentrations require further attention.    
 
 
 
Environmental  Impacts 
 
Introduction 
Before Kariba, the Middle Zambezi was a typical “sand bank” river (Jackson 1959) in 
which flood season flows in February-March were usually at least ten times those toward 
the end of the dry season in October. Silt loads, however, were relatively low with most 
sediment from the Upper Zambezi being deposited over the Barotse Plains upriver from 
Victoria Falls. Within the Zimbabwean portion of the Gwembe Valley, little land 
degradation had occurred both above and below Kariba Gorge. The one exception was 
the Zambezi’s meander zone immediately downstream from the gorges below Victoria 
Falls. There, on both sides of the Zambezi, the densest Tonga populations in the Gwembe 
had placed practically all alluvium under cultivation. Fertility had already dropped in the 
older alluvial soils, with Graham Childe noting the replacement of perennial grasses by 
annuals (personal communication). Further downstream both above and below Kariba 
Gorge, the Valley was heavily infested with tsetse fly. Tsetse also occurred on the north 
bank but were restricted to four pockets. Generally speaking, game populations were high 
in tsetse zones and human populations sparse. 
On the Zambian side, a larger Tonga population had also cleared most of the alluvial 
deposits below the meander zone except in the largest tsetse fly pocket that covered an 
extensive area upstream and downstream from the dam site. While Tonga on both banks 
continued to crop the annually flooded, younger alluvial soils twice annually with no sign 
of degradation, fertility had dropped in the older inland alluvium as in the meander zone. 
In 1956-57 we found many former fields under what appeared to be permanent fallow 
having been colonized by dense stands of various grasses some of which rose above head 
height toward the end of the rains. As the population increased, Tonga in these areas had 
begun in the 1940s to clear Karroo sediments up to several kilometers inland from the 
Zambezi. Such inland soils villagers claimed had never been cultivated before. Initially 
pioneered by those with inadequate access to alluvial gardens, by the 1950s most 
villagers had cleared inland fields as the size of their alluvial holdings dwindled due to 
subdivision and fallowing.  
By 1957 extensive inland areas had been cleared for “bush” gardens, with those 
pioneered by adjacent villages beginning to form a continual strip of cultivated land. 
Cultivated only during the rains and of lower fertility than the younger Zambezi and 
tributary alluvia, such soils at best could only support semi-permanent cultivation. 
Though fallowing had yet to begin prior to Kariba’s construction, eventually periods of 
cropping would have had to be followed by equal length, or longer, fallow periods if land 
degradation of Karroo sediments was to be avoided.   In other words, Colson and I were 
observing a dynamic system of land use which would have had major environmental 
impacts requiring a Tonga response if the dam had not been built. Indeed, even before the 
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decision had been made in favor of the Kariba site, government officials had begun to 
discuss possible resettlement options to deal with what they saw as an unsustainable 
system of land use in the meander zone.   
Reservoir Basin Impacts 
Introduction and “Operation Noah” 
Because Kariba Lake was the first major reservoir formed in the tropics, there was little 
awareness even among scientists as to what actions should be taken before flooding or 
the nature of the environmental impacts that would follow inundation. That was the case 
even where some pre-Kariba surveys had been done, examples including what to do, if 
anything, with wildlife living in the future reservoir basin and the range of estimates as to 
the future productivity of the fishery. What the local press first called “Operation Noah” 
began after a Rhodesian journalist wrote up his observations of a visit with several game 
rangers collecting specimens from the rapidly expanding reservoir in early 1959. 
Working for the Southern Rhodesian wildlife department, and with inadequate equipment 
and at considerable danger to themselves, their job was to observe the impact of 
inundation on wildlife, to collect specimens for museums, and snakes and other fauna for 
zoological parks.  
While there was no intention of attempting the impossible job of rescuing wildlife for 
release away from the floodwaters, the Kariba Lake basin was soon inundated by 
members of the international media whose stories led to demands that a major rescue 
operation commence as well as to supporting funds. In London the Faunal Preservation 
Society raised ₤10,000 while the south bank and north bank territorial governments spent 
₤100,000 and ₤30,000, respectively (Crowcroft 1960).  As a result more personnel were 
recruited who, with slightly better equipment, further risked their lives in both territories 
to rescue a small percentage of the animals that otherwise would have drowned or, in the 
case of larger fauna, made their way to the lakeshore. Some of the descriptions of their 
efforts and of the effects of inundation on wildlife were truly amazing. One journalist 
referred to millions of crickets pouring out of cracks in the soil to be devoured by vast 
numbers of birds that “blackened” the skies (Clements 1959: 182). Meanwhile, the 
children of Gwembe Tonga resettlers were dying of dysentery in the Lusitu and on the 
Plateau with virtually no recognition in the media. 
In the end what was accomplished? On the North Bank, very little granted the 
consolidation of Tonga resettlers and hosts within a diminished area. Today there is 
virtually no big game left on the Zambian side of the reservoir. While elephant or the odd 
lion still swim the Zambezi below the dam to forage in Tonga gardens or feed on Tonga 
cattle and safari operators have introduced game on Kota Kota and leased islands, 
otherwise one rarely sees mammals larger than mopane squirrels or the occasional small 
antelope. On the South Bank the situation is different, with Crowcroft  (op.cit.) noting 
that the publicity involved during “Operation Noah” was instrumental in advertising the 
beauty of the Valley as well as the establishment of national parks and safari areas  – at 
the expense, I need add, of the Gwembe Tonga whose primary access to the foreshore 
was restricted to a number of fish camps at which other economic activities are 
prohibited. On both sides, little of scientific value was added to the knowledge of 
terrestrial fauna during reservoir filling in contrast to hydrobiological and other surveys 
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in the reservoir which increased with the establishment of the Lake Kariba Fisheries 
Research Institute in 1963.  
Aquatic Weed  
As unexpected impacts began to occur following inundation, it is interesting to see how 
the perceptions of scientists, including my own, changed as knowledge increased over 
time. Initially, there was a tendency to see unexpected events in a primarily negative 
light. In a 1972 article, for example, I used the phrase “Ecological Bottlenecks” in 
describing environmental changes during the 1960s that included invasion of aquatic 
vegetation, expansion of tsetse fly, and utilization of the lakeshore margin.  
The invasion of aquatic weed was first observed during the first half of 1959 when small 
floating mats (referred to as “sudd” in the literature) of a water fern, Salvia auriculata, 
were seen. By June they were estimated to cover 75 square miles of the slowly filling 
reservoir. During 1960 other plants began to colonize the mats, with Boughy (1963) 
reporting 40 species by the end of 1961. During 1962-63 I observed small trees including 
a banana tree growing in mats where tributaries entered the reservoir through small 
estuaries. By then nearly 20 percent of the nearly full reservoir was mat covered 
(Mitchell 1965). Though I jokingly told colleagues that I next expected hippos to be 
sunbathing on them, at the time the mats were generally seen as a catastrophe.  
On the one hand, they adversely affected the Tonga fisheries in several ways. Not only 
did they keep hand-paddled boats from entering narrow estuaries, but windblown mats 
often made it impossible for fishers to access gillnets that had been set the previous 
evening. On the other hand, biologists and hydrologists worried that the mats might 
produce a dead-zone by de-oxygenating the water beneath them or form a substrate 
favorable for snails that were the alternate hosts of schistosomiasis.  Then the unexpected 
happened. After the reservoir reached full storage level in 1963, wave action on what was 
now the world’s largest reservoir began to breakup the mats, piling Salvinia up on the 
foreshore, and reducing its extent to 7 percent within a few years. The mats were also 
seen as having played a favorable role in increasingly the reservoir’s biological 
productivity by locking up in-coming nutrients that might otherwise have been lost 
downstream. Furthermore, at least in some situations they were associated with higher 
productivity, with Bowmaker (1968) reporting large numbers of juvenile fish seeking 
food and shelter beneath the mats. Though still a nuisance to fishers, the mats no longer 
presented the obstacle that had formerly been the case. 
Impacts on Tsetse Fly Distribution 
Before Kariba, no tsetse control operations were carried out within the Gwembe for 
Tonga benefit. On the south bank, the slaughter of thousands of antelope and other 
mammals within the Valley was intended to keep the fly from expanding onto White 
settler farms on the adjacent plateau. Policy had the same intention on the north bank 
although there the government tried to control fly encroachment by establishing control 
posts where vehicles, bicycles and foot travelers were checked and sprayed for fly while 
cattle could only be exported from the Valley after inoculation. The only benefit to the 
North Bank Tonga was the availability since the late 1940s of prophylactic and curative 
drugs for cattle living close to fly pockets. 
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Kariba radically changed the situation on the north bank in two major ways. At the 
insistence of the Gwembe Tonga District Council, resettlement areas were to be cleared 
of tsetse fly so that resettlers could either take their cattle with them or purchase cattle 
once there with compensation and other funds.  The government was not opposed. In the 
same department, most tsetse control and livestock officers realized that Gwembe had 
considerable ranching potential for the Tonga population. Where disease-free, generally 
speaking cattle, sheep and goats were in good condition due to ample grazing and 
browse, while Lake Kariba would alleviate the dry season water problem.  
A major control operation was begun in 1957 using land-based spraying of insecticides. 
At its height, four colonial Tsetse Control Supervisors were involved. By 1962, it looked 
like success was assured. Two of the four fly pockets were no longer seen as threatening 
while the one closest to the dam site had been significantly reduced. Following a drop at 
the time of resettlement, cattle populations in all seven chieftaincies had increased by 
1962 to their highest number to date.  
No control operations were undertaken in the fourth pocket that was located halfway up 
the reservoir. I suspect that was because of its isolation, the assumption that the tsetse fly 
would drown once it was inundated by Lake Kariba, or the small number of resettlers 
from that area. As the water rose, however, the tsetse fly began to move laterally and 
inland. By 1960 they had spread to previously fly-free Kota Kota Hill. After 1963 when 
full storage level was reached, shelter along the foreshore became an improved tsetse 
habitat as trees were more apt to retain some leaf cover throughout the dry season. An 
increasing population of fishers and fish traders also made it easier for fly to hitchhike a 
ride inland. As a result, fly spread into Muyumbwe’s inland chieftaincy that had been fly-
free throughout the 20th century and contained the largest number of cattle of any 
Gwembe chieftaincy. The result was a disaster, with cattle holdings dropping from 
approximately one per capita or less than ½ per capita between 1962 and 1966. As fly 
continued their expansion inland, they also began to threaten the white settler farms on 
the plateau. A major control operation followed which brought the situation under 
control. Though Munyumbwe cattle numbers once again were increasing, by the early 
1970s, they still had not recovered to their 1962 level in contrast to figures for Gwembe 
District as a whole that had doubled from approximately 24,000 cattle in 1962 to nearly 
52,000 in 1972.   
Below the Kariba Dam in the Lusitu area where 6,000 resettlers were moved in 1958, the 
tsetse fly situation remained precarious throughout the 1960s in spite of extensive 
spraying and the use of curative drugs. The major reason was the risk of re-infestation 
from the south bank, with fly either hitch-hiking across on elephants, fishers or poachers 
or being blown across the river. That remained the situation until the 1980s when 
Zimbabwe, with financial assistance from the European Community, began an ambitious 
tsetse control operation based on aerial spraying throughout their portion of the Middle 
Zambezi Valley. Though that proved successful as a control operation, it was not 
accompanied by the necessary land use planning with the result that large-scale 
immigration of cattle-owning farmers from the plateau increased both degradation risks 
and potential conflict with the host population.  
The Reservoir Drawdown Area 
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Today, as described in an earlier section, the drawdown area is considered to be a major 
project benefit. On the south bank it provides forage and water for a major world-class 
concentration of wildlife. On the north bank it provides Gwembe Tonga and immigrants 
with fishing, agricultural and grazing resources. It was not always seen that way. While 
the reservoir was gradually filling between December 1958 and July-August 1963 no 
drawdown cultivation was possible. However when the reservoir level began to drop for 
the first time later in the 1963 dry season, some Tonga experimented with the planting of 
early-maturing maize. Results were excellent (communication from C. Mitchell). During 
the next three years, however, reservoir filling and recession varied far more than had 
been previously the case as the dam’s operators tested the dam’s safety by experimenting 
with different flood releases, including release impacts on the downstream stilling pool. 
That increased the risks for reservoir drawdown farmers. Hence if the 1963 experimental 
planting of maize had been repeated in 1964 – as presumably it was by some farmers – 
the entire crop would have been lost as reservoir levels began to rise again less than two 
months later. Cultivation risks under such conditions of uncertainty were just too great. 
Indeed, it was not until after the North Bank Power Station began operations in 1976 that 
a more regular draw down finally began to benefit Tonga farmers. 
Degradation of Resettlement Areas Above and Below the Dam Site 
Because of inadequate land for resettlement purposes on the north bank and the 
continuation of the resettlers pre-dam system of land use, serious degradation has 
occurred in the most densely populated resettlement areas. Most seriously affected is the 
Lusitu area below the dam site where 6,000 resettlers where shifted to an area with an 
existing population of less than 2,000. At the time I estimated that the carrying capacity 
of the area under the existing system of land use had been exceeded three-fold. While I 
suspect that was an exaggeration, there is no question that too many people were 
relocated there. Figure 2 is an aerial photograph of the Lusitu area before Kariba that 
shows the location where two resettled villages would be moved in 1958. Only a very 
small area was under cultivation by the host population. Figure 3 shows remote sensing 
imagery in 1986 while Figure 4 shows the same area in 1992. Expanding areas 
designated as bare soils are truly bare soils. In drought years the area takes on a Sahelian 
appearance, with wind-swept dust sweeping across the landscape. Topsoil has been 
removed to the extent that formerly buried lateral roots of giant baobab trees are now 
exposed on the surface, with some trees actually toppling over (Figure 5). During recent 
drought years, livestock either die or must be herded elsewhere there being neither 
sufficient grazing nor browse to sustain them. Based on our ground surveys a similar 
situation has been developing in the Siameja resettlement area at the upper end of Lake 
Kariba and in the Chezia resettlement area in the middle reaches of the reservoir. The 
situation is truly horrifying for it is, in my opinion, an illustration of what is currently 
underway, though at a much slower rate of degradation, throughout Africa’s woodland 
savannas – which cover approximately one-third of the continent.   
Downstream Impacts 
Introduction 
Kariba’s construction drastically altered, and regularized, the natural regime of the 
Zambezi. Thereafter low season flows increased, while flood water flows decreased. As 
   
  
Figure 2  Lusitu Area Land Cover before Kariba Resettlement  
Source: Scudder Archives  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 3.  After Kariba Resettlement Lusitu Area Land Cover in 1986  
Source: C. Petit, E. Lambin and T. Scudder  
  
  
   
 
Figure 4. After Kariba Resettlement Lusitu Area Land Cover in 1992  
Source: C. Petit, E. Lambin and T. Scudder  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 5.  Toppled Baobab and Exposed Roots  
Source: Scudder Archives  
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designed and built, Kariba has reduced capacity to alter the adverse effects of this new 
regime since its six flood gates are located too high in the dam wall for a policy change 
that would mandate regular environmental flow releases. Since the 1981/82 rainy season, 
flood gate spillage has occurred only twice, with reservoir waters being well below full 
storage level because of reduced Zambezi flows under periodic drought conditions. While 
the completion of Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa Dam in 1975 regularized flows even 
further in the Lower Zambezi and Zambezi Delta, Cahora Bassa unlike Kariba has the 
potential to improve downstream conditions. That is because environmental flow releases 
are possible since the flood gates are located lower in the dam wall. Such flows are also 
necessary granted estimates that Kariba and other upstream dams regularize over 90 
percent of the water input into the large Cahora Bassa reservoir (Beilfuss et al, 1997).  
Though little detailed scientific research has been completed on Kariba’s downstream 
impacts and on the cumulative impacts of the Kariba, Cahora Bassa, Kafue and other 
dams, various scientists have made observations dating back to the 1960s. Especially 
important are those of Davies who has recently been able to re-examine the pre-dam 
predictions that he made in the mid-1970s based on rapid surveys that he and colleagues 
were able to complete before Cahora Bassa’s completion (Davies, 1975 and 1997; Davies 
et al, 1975). More detailed studies are under way, including one under the auspices of  
Mozambique’s Arquivo do Patriomonio Cultural (ARPAC) and the International Crane 
Foundation (ICF) that is examining ecological and socioeconomic impacts in the delta 
and along the Lower Zambezi and another involving the universities of Eduardo 
Mondlane (UEM) and Minnesota on the social history of the Cahora Bassa dam from its 
construction to the present. IUCN has also carried out a multiyear study on Zambezi 
Basin Wetlands Conservation and Resource Utilization with a four volume report (2001) 
published titled Biodiversity of the Zambezi Basin Wetlands (See Zambezi Society 2001).  
Significant for possibly developing new policies for managing Cahora Bassa was a 1997 
workshop at the dam site. Under the sponsorship of ARPAC and the Zambezi Valley 
Development Authority (GPZ), that gave over 50 scientists, managers and planners the 
opportunity to discuss the implications of the way in which the dam is being operated for 
Mozambique’s development. More significant still were meetings in the delta in March, 
2000 during which President Chissano and his ministers were able to discuss 
development options, including environmental flow releases, with delta chiefs and 
researchers (2001 written communications from Rich Beilfuss). Also significant is a 
South African-funded Strategic Development Initiative for the Lower Zambezi Valley 
that includes consultants representing various development interests. Included is an 
ARPAC/UEM/ICF/Minnesota environment impact team that “will evaluate all proposed 
developments in the context of hydrological needs for the delta in terms of ecological and 
socio-economic parameters” (ibid).   
Internationally and in Southern Africa, the need for environmental flow releases is 
receiving increased attention.  A major step forward was a detailed three years study in 
the Senegal River Valley that showed that such releases from Mali’s Manantali Dam 
would increase economic benefits (Horowitz et al, 1990). In Southern Africa, in a 6 
April, 2001 press release about the four volume IUCN wetlands biodiversity report, The 
Zambezi Society noted that the authors recommend “occasional and significant flood 
releases from the Zambezi’s network of dams…in order to maintain open habitats, clear 
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clogged channels and flush out accumulated nutrients.” Articles during 2001 in South 
Africa’s weekly Mail and Guardian and in Engineering News also discuss the benefits 
related to environmental flow releases.   
Beginning to draw down the Cahora Bassa reservoir, as well as Lake Kariba when water 
levels are above the flood gates, no later than June-July rather than months later when 
dam safety is threatened by rising waters would have two major benefits. Done yearly, 
except when reservoir levels were exceedingly low, environmental flow releases would 
enable farmers in the reservoir basins to cultivate a larger drawdown area and allow the 
extension of grasslands for the benefit of domestic stock and wildlife. Downstream flow 
releases, followed by reduced flows, to simulate a more natural flood regime, would 
nurture wetlands, increase fishery productivity and allow flood recession agriculture 
when water levels began to decline. The second major benefit from such improved flood 
management would be a significant reduction of the major flood losses associated with 
the floods of 2000 and 2001. 
What evidence is available suggests that release of such environment flows is a win-win 
situation in that it need not adversely affect power generation. According to Gammelsrod, 
“it has been demonstrated… that without using more water from the Dam, but just 
allowing for the redistribution of the runoff well within the operational possibilities, the 
CPUE [catch per unit effort] of shrimp along the Sofala bank can be increased by at least 
17%” (1992). Emphasizing that his figures were “highly preliminary,”Wilson reached a 
similar conclusion in his paper at the 1997 dam site workshop: 
“This note provides some preliminary estimates of the potential for modifying 
water discharge rates from Cahora Bassa without major compromise of its hydro-electric 
production with the objective of enhancing other socio-economic benefits in the Zambezi 
basin through sustaining essential ecological processes…Calculating opportunities based 
on actual rainfall data demonstrates that in the vast majority of years it is possible to 
achieve either the reduced dry season flows necessary or the increased discharge for 
artificial floods, without any prejudice of hydro-electric production…It should also be 
noted that economic factors would probably make it appropriate to sacrifice some hydro-
electric production in order to create artificial floods in drier years” (1997). 
One of those “economic factors” would be reduction of the type of severe economic and 
financial costs that have been caused by the 2000 and 2001 floods. In the meanwhile both 
Cahora Bassa and Kariba continue to be operated as uni-purpose projects for hydropower 
generation with the result that no environment flow releases have yet to be made nor are 
the reservoirs drawn down as a flood management procedure. On the contrary, the policy 
remains to conserve every drop of water for electricity generation with the result that 
irreversible ecosystem impacts continue to have significant human, economic and 
financial costs. 
The Downstream Situation in Zambia 
On an annual basis, scouring by silt free waters is eroding river banks in both 
Zimbabwe’s Mana Pools National Park and Zambia’s Lower Zambezi National Park, 
with the result that large riparian trees continue to topple into the river. Where it occurs, 
as in the Lusitu Delta, flood recession agriculture has been greatly curtailed since 
flooding only rarely inundates flood plains.  Vital dry season grazing is also reduced as is 
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the productivity of the fishery. In February 2000 and February 2001, flood releases from 
Kariba devastated communities from below the Kariba Gorge to the Mozambique border 
as well as within Mozambique. Following the drought years of low-inflows during which 
reservoir levels had dropped, the Zambezi River Authority was unprepared for the 
exceptionally heavy rainfall during the 1999-2000 season. Nonetheless, releases could 
have been better phased rather than the Authority waiting to commence them toward the 
end of the rainy season in late February.  That was certainly the case during the 2000-
2001 season when drawdown of a now full reservoir should have begun before the 
commencement of the rains in late 2000 so as to avoid a repetition of the February 2000 
flooding. Unfortunately that lesson has not learned until the 2001-2002 rainy season 
when anticipatory flood-management releases began in December at the start of the rainy 
season. 
Inadequately announced to downstream residents, releases in late February 2000 
destroyed much of the maize crop in Chief Chiawa’s area just before its harvest.  
According to a BBC report March 8, “More than 12,000 people are at risk of starvation… 
Crops of maize, bananas, pumpkins and groundnuts were submerged by the rising flood 
waters. Local people have been so desperate to salvage any of the precious food that they 
have been diving from canoes to try to harvest the underwater crops…at least one farmer 
has been attacked and seriously injured by a crocodile…Local people complain that they 
were given very little information…and there certainly seems to be no contingency plan 
in place to help people” (BBC, March 6, 2000).  
The next week two researchers familiar with the area submitted a report on the situation 
to UNICEF (Bond and Ndubani, March 14, 2000). After three flood gates were opened 
on February 26th, downstream Zambezi waters had risen the next day by “at least” five 
meters in the Lusitu area and below Chirundu “with the flood waters sometimes reaching 
1.5 kms inland.” In Chiawa approximately two-thirds of the households of a population 
of about 8,000 had their riverbank gardens flooded.  Noting that the March harvests from 
those gardens would have brought the annual hunger period to an end, the authors 
concluded that the “opening of the spillgates at Kariba dam has had a devastating impact 
on the livelihood of people living downstream…The impact of this flooding in the most 
food scarce months has implications for diet, income and health in the short term and in 
the long term. In the short term, people will be extremely short of their usual foods for at 
least three months and an increase in the prevalence of malnutrition, diarrhea and malaria 
is imminent. In the long term, it will take over a year for the bananas to grow and produce 
and for households to recover from the effects of the floods” (ibid).  Though some 
privately organized relief had arrived by the time of the authors’ visit, no assistance had 
yet been provided by the Government of Zambia. 
Closer to the dam, floodplain farmers suffered similar loses in Chief Chipepo’s and Chief 
Sikongo’s areas. Following a prolonged period of misfortune, the despair and anger of 
those farmers is reflected in the records of one of our former research assistants who had 
two fields in the flooded delta of the Lusitu River and was trying to restore his family’s 
livelihood as a farmer. 
 “Immediately the land became ready I planted the local sixty days variety of 
maize. The soil was wet as the sowing took place within the rainy season. The 
germination was excellent and to ensure healthy growth of the maize plants I began to 
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weed around the plants. Fate was still with us. The Zambezi River banks had not been 
flooded due to the opening of the Kariba Dam sluice gates for many years. But 
information came that the water level in the lake had reached a dangerous level. We 
wondered why the Zambezi River Authority would choose to open the sluice gates at a 
time when people still had their maize in the fields rather than do that job after harvest 
time.When the flood waters came one of our two fields was completely submerged. The 
other field was partially submerged. The submerged field became water logged to the 
extent that the maize growth became stunted and eventually resulted in the death of the 
plants. I can’t express the anger that came into our family as a result of that flooding” 
(Sikagoma Adam Senete 2000 manuscript; my italics). As for Bond and Ndubani’s 
prediction of a one year recovery period, a year later – almost to the day – the Zambezi 
River Authority again opened a number of flood gates to make another untimely release 
of flood waters.  
The Situation in Mozambique 
Kariba’s impact, combined with that of Cahora Bassa and dams on the Kafue, have had 
an even more serious impact on Mozambique’s much larger riverine population as well 
as on Zambezi River ecosystems. While the riverine population in the Middle Zambezi 
Valley between Kariba and the Mozambique border numbers substantially less than a 
quarter of a million people, well over a million inhabit the Zambezi River Valley in 
Mozambique. During 1993 I had the opportunity to visit villagers living close to the 
Lower Zambezi upriver from Marromeu. As we walked from the village down to the 
Zambezi that was about a kilometer away, my village host explained that when he had 
been a child herding goats flood waters annually had reached close to the village but now 
Zambezi waters were largely restricted to the river’s primary channel. As a result, much 
less land was available for flood recession agriculture and there was less grazing during 
those critical months at the end of the dry season. The productivity of the fishery had also 
gone down. When I asked him why such major changes had occurred, his answer was 
Cahora Bassa. 
During 1996, I overflew the Zambezi from the dam site to the Indian Ocean with Luis 
Covane, the director of ARPAC, Beilfuss and Davies. Because of reduced flooding we 
noticed that people had moved their residences closer to the Zambezi channel, in some 
cases even building on islands. Having reduced their resource base, the dam had also 
placed them at greater risk from poorly planned flood releases since Cahora Bassa was 
being operated in the same fashion as Kariba. Such releases occurred in both 2000 and 
2001. 
Negative impacts of the March 2000 flooding were especially serious in Tete – the largest 
city in the Mozambican portion of the Zambezi Valley – where suburbs were flooded. By 
the end of March, flooding was said to have affected 635,000 people, 180,000 of whom 
were living in emergency shelters. 81 people were reported dead. 
In February, 2001 once again the holding capacity of both Kariba and Cahora Bassa had 
been reached so that releases had to be based on dam safety issues as opposed to the 
interests of downstream populations.  Suburbs in Tete once again were being flooded 
with Radio Mozambique reporting that the high portion of the city was an island 
surrounded by water. Further downriver in Mutarara 55,000 people were reported to be 
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affected, 15,000 of whom were being accommodated in shelters while 26,300 were in 
shelters in Caia District. In the towns of Marromeu and Luabo, the government had urged 
80,000 people to seek out higher ground, while the need for evacuating up to 50,000 
people in the delta was being considered. By the end of the month, 400,000 people had 
been affected, with 77,000 displaced and 41 dead. Serious impacts continued through 
March. Schools were especially hard hit in Sofala Province that includes the towns of 
Marromeu and Caia. There 50 schools were closed. In Tete Province 25 schools were 
reported as completely destroyed with another 50 inundated.    
While the financial and economic costs of the 2000 and 2001 floods can be calculated, it 
is  much more difficult is to assess the costs of reduced flooding since 1958 on the 
offshore Sofala Banks, on the delta and on riverine wetlands.  As previously noted, the 
productivity of the Sofala Banks shrimp fishery, which is one of Mozambique’s major 
sources of foreign exchange, has been adversely affected with reduced yields correlated 
with dam-induced reduced runoff (De Silva 1986; Gammelsrod 1992). According to 
Davies, “Cahora Bassa has wrought massive geomorphological and ecological changes 
on the system” with actual changes “far worse” than even he had predicted in the 1970s 
(2000 communication to World Commission on Dams). In addition to reduced shrimp 
productivity, changes include collapse of the Sofala Bank fisheries and coastal erosion. In 
the delta, Davies estimates a 40-45 percent loss of mangroves.  Outlying channels have 
been clogged with aquatic vegetation that is no longer flushed out, while the productivity 
of former grasslands for wildlife has been reduced by the invasion of woody plants. In the 
main river, fish stocks have declined, while changes in vegetation suggest “saline wedge 
intrusion” (ibid). 
The Resettlement Process        
Introduction 
The Kariba Dam was the first large dam built in tropical Africa that required the 
resettlement of large numbers of an ethnic minority; indeed one of the first such dams 
anywhere in the tropics. Aside from touring officials and researchers little was known 
about the interrelationships between such people and the natural flood regimes of tropical 
rivers. In the Kariba case the topic of resettlement was never even considered by the 
Federal Government and its advisers in the decision-making process as to whether to 
proceed first with the Kariba or the Kafue dam.  Once the decision was made in favor of 
Kariba, the only reference to resettlement in Federal Power Board and World Bank 
documents was budgeting for the removal of 29,000 people as opposed to the 57,000 
eventually resettled (Soils Inc. 2000: v, 29-30). As for the responsibility for planning and 
implementing resettlement, that was handed over to the Northern and Southern 
Rhodesian territorial governments which in turn passed it on to the relevant  district and 
provincial officials.  
Aside from a brief discussion of the planning approach on the Southern Rhodesian side, 
and occasional comments for comparative purposes, the discussion that follows relates to 
the 34,000 Gwembe Tonga resettled on the north bank of the Zambezi. In spite of being 
inexperienced in dealing with a major resettlement program, and understaffed and under-
financed, the response of  local Northern Rhodesian officials to the constraints imposed 
upon them was commendable. The major constraint was the short time period available. 
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Additionally, planning that had been completed during the first year was adversely 
affected when the decision was made in June 1956 to heighten the dam by six meters. 
That increased the number to be relocated from the south bank from 11,000 to 23,000 and 
on the north bank from 29,000 to 34,000 (Colson, 1971: 26). Though less of a problem in 
Southern Rhodesia where a prior decision had been made to resettle most people well 
inland from the future reservoir, on the north bank that decision would cause inundation 
of resettlement areas under preparation in Chief Chipepo’s area (Figure 1 in Chapter 5). 
For colonial officials and the thousands of people involved, planning had to commence 
again with only 18 months remaining before early completion of the dam would result in 
the dam wall being sealed in December 1958. 
Stage 1: Planning for Resettlement 
Introduction 
In August 1955 the Federal Power Board notified the two territorial governments which 
resettlement costs would be reimbursed.  Restricted to ‘a restoration of living standards’ 
only policy, they were “confined to transportation, compensation and supervision” 
following submission of detailed accounts (Soils Inc. 2000: 32). Thereafter the two 
governments followed radically different policies. 
Southern Rhodesia 
While Northern Rhodesian policy advocated indirect rule through customary or appointed 
leaders and local councils, direct rule was the policy in Southern Rhodesia. There N.C. 
Cockcroft was the commissioner responsible for the future Kariba Lake Basin. Having 
toured the area extensively over a number of years, he was concerned about the future of 
the Gwembe Tonga. As early as 1949 he sent a nine page report to his superiors titled 
“Removal of Natives Consequent upon the Kariba Gorge Hydro-Electric Power Scheme 
– Scientific Research.” The River People, as he called them, “are the most 
unsophisticated, unspoiled and natural community I have encountered and a most fertile 
ground for scientific research.”  
Cockcroft was concerned that relocation would destroy Gwembe customs as well as 
cause resentment and adverse health impacts. He wanted a complete study to be made 
including photography and recording of music and song  - “especially the haunting 
melody of their boat songs.” Delay he wrote “will be fatal.” As for resettlement, 
Cockcroft suggested two possibilities. One was to move the people below the dam to land 
that could be irrigated once the reservoir filled. The other was to shift them well back 
from the Zambezi to more fertile inland areas at the base of the escarpment. In either case 
he hoped that the edge of the reservoir, which he saw as otherwise unproductive, would 
become a game reserve. 
Cockcroft’s concerns and development suggestions were rejected by his superiors. In a 
letter to the Chief Native Commissioner the next month, the Provincial Commissioner 
wrote “I do not share the view that the resettlement of the Bantonka (sic) will have any 
serious repercussions. They will be brought into close contact with civilization for their 
benefit and for that of the Colony” (quoted in Soils Inc 2000: 30). When resettlement 
finally began “The district magistrate assembled head men and elders to inform them that 
the dam would be built and they should be ready on a given date to move to sites that 
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they might help select. Lorry transport and some building materials would be provided. 
Taxes would be remitted for two years and grain would be issued free of charge until they 
were once more able to harvest a crop. They could expect nothing else” (Colson, 1971: 
20). Most sites selected (Figure 6) were inland from the future reservoir. 
 
Northern Rhodesia 
Government Planning: 1940s-1954 
 The situation on the Northern Rhodesian side, where more people lived on less land, was 
more complex. As early as the mid-1930s touring officials had concluded that Tonga 
reliance on the cultivation of older alluvial soils was not sustainable. By the 1940s, 
reports suggested that the carrying capacity of the land under the Gwembe Tonga system 
of agriculture had been exceeded in the upper portion of the Valley. When the Gwembe’s 
first five year development plan was drawn up in 1953, resettlement was mentioned as a 
possible solution to the recurrent hunger periods and occasional periods of famine. 
Discussion of a possible Kariba scheme in the late 1940s reinforced consideration of that 
option. Two locations were mentioned. One involved shifting people to the adjacent 
plateau where rainfall was higher and land available.  
The second location was the Lusitu area within the Valley but downriver from the dam 
site (see Figures 1 and 6). Starting below the hills through which the Zambezi had cut the 
Kariba Gorge, the Lusitu area extended downriver to Chirundu. It incorporated the lower 
reaches of the Mpendele, Mutulanganga and Lusitu tributaries.  In the 1940s the private 
sector had suggested to the territorial government that 30,000 acres were suitable for the 
commercial cultivation of sugar cane. While a private sector scheme was rejected 
because the land was gazetted as Native Reserve, as early at 1948 S.P. Bourne, the 
Gwembe District Commissioner, suggested that the area could be developed as a large 
scale smallholder resettlement scheme which could solve both the hunger problem and 
Kariba resettlement should the dam be built. A small-scale pilot project of approximately 
200 acres was initiated with water pumped from the Zambezi. 
When memos began to circulate within the government in 1952 about Kariba, Bourne 
included the Lusitu irrigation scheme as a resettlement option in his 1953 five year 
development plan for the district. Should the pilot project prove successful, he suggested 
that a sugar scheme of 5,000 to 10,000 acres could follow including a factory for milling 
up to half a million tons of cane annually. Bourne’s model was the Sudan’s Gezira 
Scheme with 3,000 – 4,000 Tonga families cultivating small holdings. His superiors, 
however, rejected his 1953 pleas for investigations of possible resettlement areas in the 
belief that the Kariba scheme would not materialize (S.P. Bourne, 1957 correspondence). 
By the time Kariba was chosen and serious resettlement planning began in 1955, Bourne 
had been transferred to another district and his scheme apparently forgotten although the 
Lusitu remained an important resettlement destination to which 6,000 resettlers were 
eventually moved in 1958. 
With the wisdom of hindsight, failure to follow-up on Bourne’s dreams has proved to be 
a costly mistake for such a irrigation scheme may well have been the only solution for 
raising the living standards of the Lusitu area’s current population of over 20,000 Tonga 
 30 
resettlers and Goba hosts. Other crops than sugar cane and other water source 
possibilities exist. Crops, as currently successfully grown on a 1,000 hectares private 
sector scheme thirty miles further down the Zambezi, could include vegetables, fruits, 
and such specialty crops as marigolds and paprika for food coloring. Though pumping 
from the Zambezi remains an option, water could also be drawn from a Kariba Lake 
offstake at Mundulundulu (Figure 12). According to a 1960 Alexander Gibb and 
Associates report, "Extensions north [from Kariba Lake] toward Lusitu would not be 
hard. Using a tunnel or pipeline, water could flow into a Mpendele tributary...Pipeline lift 
[past Chief Simamba’s Palace] would have to be only 1 1/2 miles long and 110 feet 
vertical rise" versus a tunnel of 5.5 miles length to avoid pumping costs.  
Gibb and Associates had in mind the irrigation project starting in the vicinity of the 
Kariba North Access Road in the Mpendele drainage using a small delivery weir perhaps 
15 feet high for 12 hours storage. Irrigation water then could flow into both the Mpendele 
and the Mutulanganga drainage. The latter is important because that would also give the 
dense Tonga population in the Lusitu River basin access to the scheme. Though the Gibb 
report considered such a scheme to be technically and economically feasible, at that time 
the Federal Power Board had no interest in irrigation. Today, with the existence of the 
Southern Africa Power Pool and potential hydro surpluses, such an offtake for irrigation 
becomes more feasible. 
Government Planning: 1955-1958 
1. Introduction 
Because Kariba was the first major dam built in Central Africa, neither the Gwembe 
Tonga nor the territorial government knew what to expect. As for perceptions of what 
might be involved, the Tonga’s were more realistic than those of the Provincial 
Administration (PA) that was the responsible planning and implementing agency. 
Though none of the PA and technical department staff had resettlement experience, they 
were well trained and dedicated colonial officials who showed considerable imagination 
throughout the resettlement process. For planning purposes they used aerial photographs 
and foot traverses for identifying possible resettlement areas. When areas were identified, 
they took headmen and other villagers to inspect and comment upon them. Once specific 
areas were selected, they encouraged villagers to begin building houses there and to clear 
new land so as to minimize the time when no fields would be under cultivation. Most 
successful were their attempts to open improved and newly sited schools at the same time 
as removal so as to minimize the time lost for children’s education. Realizing the 
importance of water, they tried – and failed – to provide adequate supplies. Even as 
difficulties began to build up during 1957, optimism as to a favorable outcome continued, 
with District Commissioner Sugg stating in May correspondence that “I think, eventually, 
that everyone will be a good deal better off.” 
2. Selecting Resettlement Areas 
Once the decision was made to proceed with Kariba, activities under the leadership of the 
District Commissioner included asking villagers where they wished to move, increasing 
the involvement of the district council in the resettlement process, completing land 
surveys for identifying potential resettlement areas, providing water supplies, and 
planning post-removal development activities.  Without exception all villages wished to 
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remain within the Gwembe Valley.2 Villages also wished to resettle immediately inland 
from the future reservoir, preferring to move further up the tributaries around whose 
deltas and lower reaches, or in whose proximity, they were clustered. As is the case with 
a majority of involuntary resettlers throughout the world, moving the shortest distance 
possible both geographically and sociologically would allow them to remain with a 
familiar host population in a familiar habitat. For such reasons no villages wished to 
move into the Lusitu area below the dam site, or even to the more familiar plateau which, 
unlike the Lusitu, at least was occupied by Tonga-speakers.  
3. Involving the Gwembe Tonga District Council 
The Provincial Administration had two important reasons for involving the Gwembe 
District Council in the resettlement process. One was due to the Colonial Service’s policy 
commitment to indirect rule. In that regard, the PA can be considered a pioneer in 
attempting to involve a population undergoing dam-related resettlement in at least part of 
the decision making process. The other reason was less commendable since it was based 
on using the Council’s approval of resettlement as a counterfoil to the growing influence 
of the African National Congress (ANC). Proscribed in 1953, the independence-oriented 
ANC had opposed the Federation’s creation and it opposed the Kariba Project as one 
more example of efforts by white minority interests to dominate the political economy of 
both territories. 
While local councils in many British colonies derived their authority from the 
involvement of customary leaders, such was not case with the egalitarian Gwembe 
Tonga. In that case, the Colonial Government had arbitrarily appointed seven village 
leaders with varying degrees of influence in their neighborhoods as Gwembe Tonga 
chiefs. The council that was build around them starting in the 1930s was considered to be 
a Colonial not a Gwembe Tonga institution. Furthermore in its earliest years, the majority 
of its employees came from outside the Valley due to the small number of local people 
with sufficient education. 
The upgrading of the council was a major priority of S.P. Bourne when he became 
District Commissioner in 1947. In 1949 he moved its headquarters from the plateau into 
the middle of the Gwembe Valley. By 1953, four councilors dealing with health and 
education, agriculture, public works and water development, and finance, along with 
three nominated and three elected members, had been added to the 7 chiefs and their 
assessors. Subordinate staff numbered 123. By 1955, the chief councilor was the first 
Gwembe Tonga to have received some university education. This was E. Habanyama 
who had attended a one year course at England’s Bristol University. Thereafter 
increasing pressure was put on the Council to take a public stance affirming the Lusitu’s 
benefits for the 39 villages that the PA wished to resettle there. While this position was 
agreed upon at a Council meeting during the latter half of 1957, by November the 
Council had yet to make a public declaration causing the administration to complain that 
villagers remained unaware of the Council’s position. They did agree, however, to tour 
the 39 villages in March 1958 to inform them of the need to move to the Lusitu and of the 
                                                 
2  Some individual households opted for resettlement in the neighboring plateau where they had kin 
and cattle. 
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area’s advantages.  That visit occurred on schedule with the District Council then 
formalizing their endorsement of the necessity for the Lusitu move in a Local Council 
Order.  
While the Council continued to be seen by Gwembe villagers as a pawn of the colonial 
administration, nonetheless Habanyama and his colleagues were able to negotiate in 1955 
ten very important concessions (Colson 1971:22-23; 1958 Gwembe Commission Report): 
1. People were to have a choice as to where they moved, whenever possible. 
2. Compensation should be paid to the Council to cover general losses and to 
individuals to cover personal losses.  
3. Shrines should be given care. 
4. The Council should have the right to license and tax new enterprises attracted 
to Kariba Lake. 
5. Customary law would not be changed. 
6. Government should not demand that people change their agricultural methods. 
7. The Council should not be forced to help with the building of the dam and 
need not require its people to work upon it. 
8. Food should be supplied to people who had to leave their gardens to open new 
land. 
9. Government should attempt to remove tsetse fly from proposed resettlement 
areas. 
10. The people should be allowed to reoccupy any land which was not in fact 
flooded. 
For development purposes the 9th and 10th points were especially important. The 9th point 
enabled the Gwembe Tonga to effectively integrate cattle into their farming system and 
to provide a source of cash income. Unlike the situation on the south bank, the 10th point 
sanctified the subsequent movement of hundreds of families back to the edge of the 
reservoir and the utilization of its drawdown area and inshore fisheries by thousands. 
Also important was a government decision that the inshore fisheries initially would be 
reserved to Gwembe residents.  
4. Arable Land Surveys 
By the end of 1956, approximately 80,000 acres had been identified within the valley for 
resettlement purposes. Soils in half of those areas, however, were considered poor sands 
or sandy loams for farming so that the inadequacy of the land base for the  most 
important component of the resettlers’ economy was known to colonial officials from the 
start. The two best areas were Buleya-Malima  in the central part of the district with 
12,000 acres of good sandy loams under acacia woodland and up to 15,000 (and perhaps 
20,000) acres of good sandy/clay loams in the Lusitu area.  
In addition to an inadequate land resource base throughout the Valley for resettlement 
purposes, nearly one-quarter of that land was in the Lusitu area which resettlers continued 
to reject. Though good land was also scarce for resettling villages in other areas, the 
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worst situation was in Chief Chipepo’s area where less than 6,000 acres of generally poor 
soils were available in inland areas for the resettlement of nearly 10,000 people living in 
56 villages. Part of that land became unavailable after the 1956 decision to heighten the 
dam. By then it was clear to the administration that the only possible option for 39 of 
those villages, containing a majority of Chipepo’s resettlers, was removal to the Lusitu. 
Tours by Chipepo headmen and selected villagers of inland areas began in November 
1956. Five sites were available in several of which preliminary allocation and marking of 
gardens began in May 1957 following the end of the rainy season.  Though requiring 
increased use of scarce resettler labor resources for later development, some of that land 
would eventually be inundated by the rising reservoir. Apparently with the agreement of 
the villagers, its use was a concession to the scarce land resources in the area. Presumably 
it was also part of the Administration’s plan to prepare shallow areas of the reservoir for 
inshore fishing by clearing the bush. Except for the construction of schools, which were 
generally ready to receive children when resettlement occurred, preparation activities 
were inadequate. Lack of promised water supplies for drinking, washing and construction 
purposes was one reason. Over-estimation by the PA of available village labor was 
another (Colson, 1971).  
Granted the desire of all villages to remain in the Valley, the PA planned for  Lusitu 
resettlement from the start. With the insistence of the District Council that resettlers 
should remain under their current chiefs no matter where they moved, an important step – 
successfully accomplished – was for the two resident chiefs below Kariba Gorge to agree  
not just to accept thousands of resettlers but also their continued allegiance to Chief 
Chipepo. The first Lusitu tour by Chipepo headmen was in December 1956. It was 
combined with a visit to the dam site. None of those involved showed the slightest 
interest in such a move. The Lusitu was too far away; a conclusion that also applied to the 
land of another Tonga chief that was traversed en route to the Lusitu. While they liked 
the visit to the dam site, they considered the Lusitu visit a “waste of time.” They also 
asked at the visit’s end “if visits of this kind could be curtained during the rains as 
inconvenience was caused to the planting of their gardens” (PA November 1956 Tour 
Report).  
During 1957 the PA continued to hope that a majority of Chipepo’s headmen could be 
persuaded to make the Lusitu move for, as the district commissioner wrote in a March 
letter, that area “appears to be the only possible place for the majority of Chief Chipepo’s 
people to move to.” In the meanwhile preparatory work commenced which included 
tsetse control operations, survey of sites for the possible construction of weirs, and 
drilling of water supply boreholes. 
Well aware that Lusitu soils were better for agriculture than those available at the inland 
sites, some Chipepo villagers and headmen did consider a move there.  Following a visit 
by 60 resettlers from 15 villages in May 1957, individuals from ten of those tentatively 
chose village sites and garden areas close to the Zambezi between the Kariba Hills and 
the Mutulanganga. Noting that they came from some of the most “recalcitrant villages” 
the accompanying PA official exulted that at least some villagers were shifting away 
from their previous dogmatic assertion that they would only move when the water came. 
Increasingly optimistic about solving remaining resettlement problems, he hoped to 
establish nuclei later that year from all 39 villages slated for Lusitu resettlement. Then the 
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majority could be moved during 1958. His optimism was unrealistic, as was the belief of 
the authorities that earlier involvement of the District Council in the resettlement process 
might have changed people’s attitudes. 
5. Water Supplies 
Provision of adequate water supplies prior to resettlement was a failure which can also be 
generalized for dam-related resettlement in other parts of the world. In the Kariba case, 
the problem began when the first four villages were moved in 1956 because of proximity 
to the dam site. As noted in the 1956 Annual Report of the District Council, the delay in 
providing water supplies there was unfortunate. Not only did similar delays occur in other 
villages subsequently moved inland from the future reservoir, but inadequate supplies 
continue to this day in many areas. Initial water supply problems also plagued a majority 
of the 6,000 people moved to the Lusitu. There boreholes drilled either came up dry or 
were saline, with inadequate supplies remaining until a reticulation scheme of piped 
water pumped from the Zambezi was built in 1960. Providing unpurified water, that 
scheme remains the major source of water today for a majority although periodically the 
system breaks down.  
Today the two resettlement areas with the densest population of resettlers are the Lusitu 
area and the Siameja area at the upper end of Kariba Lake. By 2001, “Provision of 
adequate good quality water for the Lusitu community is the biggest social problem the 
people are currently facing…Some health problems (particularly those pertaining to 
diarrhoea and dysentery) … could be associated with excessive amounts of chemical 
elements and the faecal coliforms present in all sources of water ” (Yambayamba et al 
2001: viii and 52). There as well as in the Siameja area inadequate water supplies are also 
a contributing factor to ongoing outbreaks of cholera (previously nonexistent in the 
Valley). Inadequate water supplies also remain a major problem within the Zimbabwe 
portion of the Valley. In Binga District, “Its remains an irony to the River Tonga that 
most of them do not yet benefit from the great resource of Kariba Lake, their former 
waters.” Despite a growing population, and “despite all the efforts that have been made in 
the past, there remains a serious problem in Binga District regarding the availability of 
safe drinking water” (Tremmel, 1994: 48-9). 
6. Development Activities 
Development activities planned to restore, and hopefully improve, Gwembe Tonga living 
standards concentrated on education, agricultural development, and development of an 
inshore, artisanal fishery. Successful development of an inshore fishery has had 
especially important policy implications for future dams since it documented that 
reservoir fishing could provide an important economic opportunity for resettling and host 
populations. 
Both the District Council and the Provincial Administration emphasized the importance 
of improving educational facilities and school attendance. At the Council, Habanyama’s 
influence was especially important. Before going to England, he had been Councilor for 
Agriculture and Education. Increasing school enrollment, especially for girls, remained a 
major concern that was reflected in a Local Council Ordinance requiring primary school 
attendance for both genders under threat of punishment of neglectful elders. Providing 
improved and upgraded schools at the time of removal was a major success, including the 
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1958 opening of the first full primary school for girls. Plans were also initiated for the 
Valley’s first secondary school. “Opened” in 1962 when the first class was 
accommodated at an existing secondary school on the Plateau, students were transferred 
in 1964 to their newly built school on the edge of Kariba Lake.  
Planning for agricultural development emphasized erosion control, crop production and 
tsetse fly control. Probably because the Gwembe Tonga wanted it, and the District 
Council insisted on it as one of their ten points negotiated with the Central Government, 
tsetse control had the most successful results. At the height of control operations, four 
supervisors from the Department of Game and Tsetse Control oversaw activities. The 
technology used combined residual spraying from the ground of a mixture of DDT and 
Dieldrin with bush clearing. Spraying eventually proved successful in allowing all 
resettled villages to obtain cattle, including those that had none due to their previous 
residence in tsetse zones. The extensive bush clearing associated with fisheries 
development and clearing of new fields in resettlement areas reduced the danger of re-
infestation by destroying the fly’s preferred habitat.  Subsequent increases in cattle 
throughout the Valley allowed the majority of the Gwembe Tonga for the first time in 
their history to shift from hoe cultivation to mixed farming based on ox traction. That 
reduced labor constraints. During the initial years of resettlement, it also allowed larger 
fields to be cultivated.  
Planning for erosion control had little local support. Though  kilometers of contour ridges 
were eventually made, the Gwembe Tonga had little interest in their maintenance. After 
several rainy seasons they vanished. The major constraint for increasing crop production 
was too little arable land surrounding resettlement sites, and the lower fertility of most of 
what land was available in comparison to the alluvial and colluvial soils that the Gwembe 
Tonga preferred. Planning by agricultural staff concentrated on experimenting with 
different crop and crop rotations in small demonstration gardens opened on different soil 
types. Experiments were also initiated with tie ridging within fields to retain rainfall. 
Most successful was planning for an inshore artisanal or peasant fishery. Aware that 
arable land resources were insufficient, the District Commissioner saw fishing as the 
future mainstay of the local economy. This belief came from his acceptance of the 
estimate of the Kariba Lake Fisheries Committee that reservoir water less than 100 feet 
deep could produce 20,000 tons of fish each year on a sustainable basis.  Though 
subsequently shown to be too high, this estimate led to a well-prepared planning process 
that subsequently was to play a major role in the Stage 3 development of the Gwembe 
economy. Presumably it also helped the District Commissioner resist the efforts of those 
who wanted to restrict fishing to a commercial company or open it to all Africans. Should 
such policies be enacted, how could the Gwembe Tonga be expected to restore, and 
hopefully improve, their living standards? 
The District Commissioner’s plans for developing the fishery had two components. One 
dealt with preparation of the future reservoir; the other was targeted at the Gwembe 
Tonga. Reservoir development involved both territories and the Federal Government, 
each of which had provided a million pounds sterling. Though the experts disagreed on 
the future productivity of the fishery, all agreed that it would be essentially a gill-net 
fishery. They also agreed that some bush clearance from shallower waters would be 
necessary to allow gill nets to be set at varying depths. The big question was how much at 
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what cost. The final decision was to clear approximately 250,000 acres which was half of 
the most suitable areas. At the far end of the future reservoir, land was cleared right down 
to the Zambezi’s primary channel which would be at about 120 feet depth when the 
reservoir reached full storage level. Elsewhere, clearance was to a depth of about 60 feet. 
Eventually 126,000 acres were cleared on the north side and 108,000 on the south side. 
Total costs were ₤2.5 million or ₤19 an acre. Uncleared areas were alternated with 
cleared ones. Ironically the former proved to be the most productive since uncleared bush 
provided a substrate for a wide range of plant and animal products that provided food for 
fish. 
As for the Gwembe Tonga component of the District Commissioner’s plan, prior to 
resettlement he allocated a number of gillnets to potential Tonga fishers and to select 
schools. Plans were also drawn up for a fisheries training center at Sinazongwe half way 
up the reservoir and for a series of fish camps and District Council fish markets along the 
edge of the reservoir. The Council was also authorized to collect a levy from fish traders 
as they left the Valley. 
Gwembe Tonga Perceptions 
Gwembe Tonga anxiety about what the future might bring, though ill-defined, was 
prescient. It was increased by understandable suspicions as to the reasons for their 
resettlement. As my colleague George Appell said when we were both graduate students 
at about the same time as Kariba resettlement was underway, love of natal environment 
may well be a cultural universal. To the Gwembe Tonga “there is nothing like the 
Zambezi Valley. There is nothing that can replace the beauty of the hills and their hearts 
are in the shrines of their forefathers” (Gwembe Tonga District Council Annual Report, 
1956). 
In October 1956 after Colson and I had each settled into a village soon to be resettled, we 
were surprised by the villagers’ friendly acceptance of our presence. After all, we worked 
for an organization that they associated with a government that planned to displace them 
and whose name was prominently displayed on our land rovers. Later we came to suspect 
that they were in denial about their forthcoming removal, such denial being one coping 
mechanism used by people in similar predicaments throughout the world to deal with an 
unacceptable reality. 
To those involved, denial also had a rational basis since people simply did not believe 
that it was possible to flood their villages by building a dam many kilometers 
downstream. Even headmen who had been taken to the dam site to view construction 
activities could not relate them to their impending removal. In Mazulu Village where I 
was living, the headman continued building a new homestead not because he believed 
that more compensation would be forthcoming but rather to reflect his increasing status 
as a prominent villager. As for my efforts to explain future flooding by filling reservoirs 
that I made in termite mounds, they were met by amused disbelief that they had any 
relationship to a dam being build over 50 kilometers downstream in Kariba Gorge. 
As people increasingly began to realize that the government did, indeed, intend to move 
them, the belief began to circulate that the real reason was to allow white settlers to move 
into the area to farm the fertile alluvial soils fringing the Zambezi and its major 
tributaries. That belief was reinforced by the extensive bush clearing begun in 1957 for 
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the development of an artisanal fishery.  Since clearing of bush by hand or by tractors 
connected by a large ball and chain were techniques also used for preparing land for 
farming, and was restricted to shallow areas of the future reservoir several kilometers 
inland from the Zambezi, the ‘fisheries development’ explanation struck Gwembe 
villagers as an insult to their intelligence. On the contrary, such bush clearing was proof 
that the land was being cleared for farming by white settlers or as airstrips for bringing 
them in (GTDC Annual Report, 1957). 
As bush clearing, road construction and other preparatory activities continued, any doubts 
that the Gwembe Tonga may have had about their forthcoming involuntary removal 
vanished. Hesitantly an unknown proportion began to plan for their evacuation. Fearful of 
tsetse fly and big game in the designated resettlement areas, some began to shift their 
livestock to relatives in the Valley who lived outside the inundation area, and on the 
Plateau. Relying on the familiar, an increased emphasis by all was placed on kinship in 
undertaking preparatory activities (Colson, 1971: 70-71). That included transferring to 
relevant senior kin across the Zambezi ritual activities essential for the continued 
ancestral protection of the living. While we do not know when such transfers began, their 
occurrence showed that at least some recognized the possibility that water might separate 
them in the future.  
Stage 2: Physical Removal, Multidimensional Stress and Early Attempts at Adaptation 
Physical Removal 
The move from old to new sites became a stress-laden crash program for the majority. In 
spite of a commendable effort made by resettlement officials, the time available before 
the dam wall was sealed was inadequate. Though eventually PA officials were 
complemented by agricultural, veterinary, tsetse and game control, fisheries, and forestry 
staff, and by private sector firms for provision of water supplies, more staff was needed. 
The efficiency of those involved was also restricted  by lack of radio communication 
(often requested but only supplied  at a late date) and transport. Number and quality of 
water facilities continued to be inadequate, while those that existed often broke down, ran 
dry or produced undrinkable water. As a result people too often were moved to ill-
prepared sites at which they also became dependent on food relief.  
Due to their inexperience, Government staff also made mistakes. The most serious was to 
inform future resettlers they would not be forced to move at any particular point in time. 
Rather, if they wished, they could remain in their villages until the water began to rise. 
That was an unacceptable position as the officials subsequently learned when the 
Zambezi flooded to record heights in February-March 1957 and March 1958. Because  
rapidly rising water could cut off some villages once the dam wall was  sealed, that 
policy had to be replaced by mandatory resettlement on specific dates. Another mistake 
was to prohibit people from planting dry season river bank and delta gardens after the 
record 1958 flood although in that case many villagers planted their gardens anyhow and 
reaped a good harvest which reduced their dependence on food relief following removal. 
A third mistake was to blame what opposition arose not on resettlement as such but on 
the inability of the Tonga to understand what was both necessary and good for them and  
on local agitators and the African National Congress. More aware of cultural nuances 
such as the concern of one neighborhood to shifting its shrine to another ethnic area, the 
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members of the District Council had a more realistic perception of the situation. On the 
other hand, both the Council and the Administration were sensitive to the confusion 
among resettling villages caused by the decision to heighten the dam, especially where 
that decision required telling villages in Chief Chipepo’s area that they could no longer 
go to previously agreed upon inland areas. Both were also sensitive to possible problems 
between hosts and resettlers in what would be more crowded areas of human settlement.  
Only the four villages closest to the dam site were resettled in 1955.  During 1956 
planning and preparation continued in other inland areas as well as in the Lusitu. In Chief 
Chipepo’s area the first three villages moved to one of the five inland areas in August 
1957, while nuclei from other villages occupied three of the other four sites (the fifth to 
be resettled during 1958). All five moves were considered successful by the authorities 
who noted that children only missed one day in shifting between schools in the first area. 
Though inadequate water supplies continued to be a problem, and village labor 
constraints slowed village reconstruction and land preparation, hence prolonging the 
period of dependence on government supplied food, removal proceeded in other inland 
areas on schedule.  
Far different was the situation in the Lusitu where the district officer in charge wrote in 
September 1957 “much time and effort were wasted, and frustration experienced, in an 
abortive attempt to establish during the month, nuclei of resettlement villages…40 
villages were to have taken part by sending representatives, 2-3 from each, to the Lusitu 
to demarcate and establish on the ground village sites only. These people would then 
have returned after 2-3 weeks to their villages had they so wished” (PA September 1957 
report). Response, however, to that approach was “wholly negative.”  Showing his 
increasing frustration, the official began to blame the people for what he saw as their 
“truculent, even belligerent attitudes” which were interfering with administration 
activities. All such opposition, including whatever opposition was noted in other 
chieftaincies, was blamed on local and outside agitators rather than on the resettlement 
process. 
Based on current knowledge of the multidimensional stress and hardships associated with 
involuntary resettlement, the negative reactions of the Gwembe Tonga to the Lusitu move 
in particular were predictable and understandable. Well over a hundred kilometers 
downstream, the Lusitu was an unfamiliar habitat settled by a different ethnic group - the 
Shona-speaking Goba.  In Tonga opinion, it was also an area to be feared. For reasons 
that remain unknown, the Lusitu was sparsely populated in spite of its good soils. Of 
particular concern to the Tonga, who buried their dead individually close to their houses, 
Goba villages were interspersed with what appeared to be abundant cemeteries located 
within sacred groves. While Colson and I speculated that the area had been heavily hit by 
the 1918-19 influenza epidemic, or perhaps by smallpox that had continued to recur in 
the Valley until 1948, or sleeping sickness, the Tonga explanation was a particularly 
virulent form of witchcraft. Called nghozi, this originates when the deceased, believing 
himself killed by witchcraft, arranges for medicine to be placed in his grave that will not 
only kill the witch who attends the funeral but also all mourners at the witch’s own 
funeral and all mourners at funerals thereafter. 
In an effort to alter people’s negatives attitudes, in October 1957 the chief’s deputy (who 
subsequently became Chief Chipepo) was moved to the Lusitu along with two staff. 
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Within a month he was threatening to move back with his family to his old home, by 
foot, if necessary, because of lack of food and inadequate government progress in 
providing appropriate housing and tractor-plowing of new fields. Those activities were 
completed, however, by the end of the year at which time the resettlement officer 
reported that the three families involved “are favorably impressed” with the area though 
residents in the 39 villages continue to be anti-Lusitu. 
When the rainy season ended in March-April 1958 none of the 39 villages had yet to be 
moved. Resistance was strongest among villages that fronted on the Zambezi. Though 
five inland villages accepted relocation in May, within the next few months their new 
village sites were largely deserted, most villagers having returned to their old homes 
because of the failure of the new boreholes to provide adequate water supplies. 
Opposition increased in June when one headman and his villagers refused outright to 
move to the Lusitu. Attempts to arrest him caused a riot during which PA staff and 
members of the Local Authority were forced from the village.  
Resistance thereafter spread. Having failed to convince the villagers to move, and aware 
of the imminent closing of the dam, the PA mandated a September date for commencing 
removal. Lorries were brought in. By then a large number of village men had assembled 
in one neighborhood to emphasize their unwillingness to move. The administration called 
in the mobile police. Then the territorial governor arrived in full ceremonial dress and 
accompanied by a military band. While the police paraded along the floodplains of the 
Zambezi, the villagers held their own maneuvers nearby. They had spears, clubs and 
utilitarian and ceremonial axes. The police had guns.  Failing to negotiate a solution to 
the impasse, the governor ordered the people into the lorries. The Gwembe men charged 
the mobile police who, believing their lives under threat, fired. Eight Gwembe Tonga 
were reported to have died and at least 32 were wounded.  
No police or administrative staff were seriously injured, probably because the Tonga had 
not intended to use their weapons. A story told by Clements is suggestive that the Tonga 
were play-acting. While on tour before the slaughter, the district office in charge asked an 
old man why he was armed with spears. The reply was “I am going to the war.” When 
asked who he was going to fight, the old man is said to given the district officer a friendly 
grin before replying “Why, you, of course!” Subsequently the old man was killed after 
being shot in the chest by the mobile police (1959: 145).  The confrontation was not 
inevitable. It arose because a group of well meaning amateurs was attempting to plan and 
execute a complicated resettlement operation with inadequate time and resources and no 
access to external expertise.  
Never expecting that the Government would go so far as to kill them, the people’s 
opposition to the Lusitu move immediately collapsed. During the next few months the 
majority of the 6,000 people were trucked to the Lusitu. Some 8,500 sheep and goats 
were also moved by vehicle, while 300 head of cattle trekked to the Lusitu, “without 
loss” as the District Commissioner wrote approvingly in his 1958 annual report. As 
elsewhere throughout the Valley, the lateness of the move until after the commencement 
of the rainy season meant that what cropland could be cleared and planted would be 
totally inadequate to feed the resettlers. Their dependence on food relief was to continue 
until the 1959/60 rainy season harvest at the very earliest. 
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The Multidimensional Stress of Resettlement 
Introduction 
Cockcroft’s prediction in 1949 that Gwembe Tonga resettlement in Southern Rhodesia 
would cause health problems, resentment and loss of customs anticipated the 
physiological, psychological and cultural components of multidimensional stress which  
became a major threat to Gwembe Tonga society and culture during Stage 2. During 
Colson’s visit to the Gwembe Valley less than two years after the completion of 
resettlement, people told her how they saw being “removed from their homes and forced 
to live in hostile environments” as an attack on their humanity (buntu) and their vital 
force (buumi). Similar comments continued to be made during our 1962-63 restudy 
(Colson, 1971: 70-71). In 1999, over 40 years after removal, Fanuel Cumanzula, from 
Chief Binga’s area on the south bank, still referred to how Gwembe Tonga lost their 
“dignity and humanity” at the time of resettlement (EMG 2000: 6.3). Researchers in 2000 
were told stories of three elders in Chief Sinazongwe’s area refused to move even as 
rising water surrounded them. One linked his identity to a tamarind tree which he could 
not leave behind, challenging the authorities to remove him and the tree. As with the 
other two elders, he only left when relatives came in a dugout canoe to remove him (Soils 
Inc. 2000: 31). 
Compulsory resettlement hit at the core of Gwembe Tonga’s pride in their independence. 
It hit at the status of all people with influence down to the household head since he, as 
protector of his dependents, was unable to reverse the administration’s resettlement 
decision.  It is hard to imagine a more total means for demonstrating a people’s 
impotence, or lack of control over their future, than to move them against their will from 
a familiar land to an unfamiliar one. 
Physiological Stress 
Since the mid-1950s Colson’s and my research methodology has placed major emphasis 
on trying to record every birth and death in three villages and approximately half of those 
in a larger fourth village (Figure 1). Analysis of the accumulated data during the 1990s by 
demographer Samuel Clark indicate that marital fertility declined immediately after 
physical removal, dropping from 11 children in 1956-58 to 8.5 in 1959-61 before 
rebounding to 9.5 as prosperity increased during 1962-64.  Though child mortality 
declined during the 1959-61 period, presumably because of improved medical facilities, 
mortality rates among the elderly were significantly higher during the 1959-61 period 
than they were from 1962 through 1964. 
While lack of pre-resettlement public health surveys make it difficult to associate 
morbidity and mortality with specific resettlement-related conditions and illnesses, what 
data is available suggests that resettlement was responsible for increased morbidity and 
mortality in specific areas.  With one major exception, those areas shared two common 
features. One was inadequate water supplies; the other the increased “strangeness” that 
accompanied removal to a more distant and unfamiliar area. The major exception  was on 
the south bank where Chief Sinakatenge moved inland along a familiar tributary. Though 
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hushed up at the time by the Southern Rhodesian authorities, there an epidemic of human 
sleeping sickness broke out that killed an unknown number of people. 
On the north bank, the highest mortality rates were recorded among 1,600 of Chief 
Mwemba’s people who were moved to two locations on the Plateau and among the 6,000 
resettlers moved to the Lusitu. In the plateau resettlement areas, epidemics of chicken 
pox and measles killed 41 children in January 1959. Subsequently the majority of those 
resettlers moved back to the Valley. In  Lusitu crowding, inadequate water supplies, and 
severe protein deficiencies presumably increased the death rate from dysentery in the 
months immediately after resettlement. By the end of January, 80 people had died. Again 
small children were the main victims. Later that year, as the dry season progressed, 
women and children, but no men, began to die of “an acute condition of sudden onset and 
high and rapid mortality” (Gadd, Nixon et al, 1962: 495). A few additional deaths 
occurred late in the 1960 dry season. In all 56 women and children died including 
approximately 10 percent of the population  in one village. Convinced that witchcraft 
substances (nghozi) were responsible for the deaths and would eventually kill all 
resettlers, people were terrified. Fearing that agitators might be intentionally poisoning 
people, the administration grouped some villagers from the most affected area together 
where food and water supplies could be monitored. For others, they relaxed the 
Ordinance that they had pressured the District Council to pass that prohibited Lusitu 
villagers without a permit from returning to unflooded areas in the reservoir basin. Two 
villages left the Lusitu area never to return. 
Even in 1962, after the mystery deaths had stopped, the Gwembe Tonga view prevailed 
that the land was bad. According to a senior headman quoted by Colson, “This is an area 
where people were not meant to live. It would not be so bad if the adults died and the 
children lived, for that would mean that life would go on. But when children die, as they 
do in Lusitu, this means an end to life (buumi)” (1971: 55). 
The actual cause of the mystery deaths remains unknown. Based on the symptoms, the 
clustering of deaths toward the end of the dry season, and the age and sex of the victims, 
the most likely cause was consumption of toxic plants gathered by women and children 
during periods of food scarcity. Ideally Gwembe Tonga meals should include  a cereal 
staple that can be dipped in, or consumed with, a side dish or relish. Relishes included 
animal protein as well as cultivated vegetables and wild plants. In 1956-57 wild food 
plants were the dominant relish for family households prior to their move to Lusitu 
(Scudder, 1971: 20). In Lusitu, toward the end of the dry season when fires had swept the 
ground of plant material, women and children may well have confused toxic tubers with 
ones that were edible in their former homes.  
Psychological Stress 
Throughout the Valley the first two years following removal were the most difficult for 
the Gwembe Tonga (Scudder and Colson, 1982: 142, Colson, 1971). Both “grieving for a 
lost home” (Fried, 1963) and anxiety for the future characterized Gwembe Tonga 
resettlers. In the Lusitu, reactions to the mystery deaths are an extreme example of the 
impact of resettlement on mental health. Everywhere older adults accused the 
administration of throwing them away in the bush where they would be buried amidst the 
stones as opposed to the older Zambezi alluvia on which so many riverine villages were 
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built. Women were especially concerned. Seldom well traveled, they had a closer 
identification than men with alluvial gardens which had come to them through their 
mothers and mother’s mothers. Identification with these lineage lands was very strong. 
Year after year women had rebuilt or re-thatched their garden shelters on the same spot. 
Here generations of their ancestors had carried on daily activities or sat out rain showers 
while their children had played close to the shelters during the hours of sunlight. The 
sense of continuity and peace found within these gardens was destroyed forever when 
Kariba was sealed. 
Neighborhood ritual leaders were especially concerned since their legitimacy was tied to 
specific shrines and to specific gardens in which they must initiate agricultural activities 
for the welfare of all. Could such fields and shrines be re-established in resettlement 
areas, all of which fell under the ritual leaders of the host population?  As with resettlers 
the world over, the Gwembe Tonga were reluctant to leave behind their dead and their 
homes. On the south bank, Sibulobe Mutale said “We wondered about our ancestors 
whose graves would soon be covered by water. Even after we moved, we still returned to 
plant in our gardens by the river and stay in our old huts. We visited our former villages 
until our huts were flooded over and no village could be seen” (Tremmel, 1994: 36).  
As people of the Zambezi, most of whom were moved inland to water-stressed areas, the 
theme of water figured prominently in people’s reactions to resettlement. Tremmel has 
best documented this in his 1995 The People of the Great River the subtitle of which is 
The Tonga Hoped the Water Would Follow Them. That sub-title was provided by one of 
his 16 co-authors who were south bank Tonga whose experiences he documented. 
Throughout their collaboration she kept stating “we left with our property and our bodies, 
but we left our water behind. We would like our water to follow us” (page 39). Water 
figured prominently in the lives and statements of others among the 16. Born in 1927, 
Luwo Mudenda is partially blind and can “no longer walk the long distances needed to 
reach safe drinking water. Instead, she is forced to drink water from ponds where animals 
drink” (ibid, 12). Solomon Mutale lost eight of his children after resettlement. In 
explaining why he said “When we stayed by the river, the water was fast-flowing and 
safe to drink. Once we were moved, we had to drink stagnant water and I think this is 
what killed my children” (ibid: 42) and “In our new settlements, we rely on the rain. 
Before we could always rely on the river. If there is no rain now, we fail to feed ourselves 
and there is no water in our borehole or stream” (ibid: 49).  
Socio-cultural Stress 
Socio-cultural stress was primarily caused by loss of influence by individuals and loss of 
familiar cultural inventory which could have eased adjustment immediately after 
removal. Starting at the household level, all types of leadership were adversely affected 
when removal occurred in spite of people’s opposition. Leadership, both political and 
religious, “at the neighborhood level was largely a victim of relocation. And was not 
clearly re-instituted even ten years later” (Colson, 1971: 206). This applied to 
neighborhood ritual leaders who were unable to transfer their influence to resettlement 
sites and to headmen. Chiefs from the four relocated chiefdoms also lost influence. So too 
did the District Council which the administration had compelled to endorse orders 
supporting removal and, in the case of Lusitu resettlers, banning return to areas of origin. 
Especially hard hit was Chief Councillor E. Habanyama who had done the most to adapt 
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resettlement to Gwembe conditions. Not only did he lose influence in the Valley but his 
cooperation with the administration adversely affected his ability following independence 
in 1964 to gain  prominence on the national scene. 
Reduction of cultural inventory affected all aspects of Gwembe Tonga culture. 
Indigenous knowledge of a Zambezi River habitat had reduced relevance in inland areas 
with different topography, soils and plant communities. In the economic realm, closer 
government supervision made it more difficult to continue such proscribed activities as 
cultivation of marijuana and a range of customary hunting techniques. Sheep, an 
important means for ‘banking’ wealth, fared poorly in inland resettlement areas with 
most dying.  Family relationships were seriously strained while lineages were weakened 
because of “a diminished emphasis upon corporate rights and responsibilities (Colson, 
1971:71). Varying from one area to another, customs relating to ritual activities and to 
major life events were truncated. At the neighborhood level field and shrine based rituals 
associated with the agricultural cycle stopped as did puberty rituals in those communities 
that had practiced them. 
Loss of cultural inventory and socio-cultural stress were most serious in the Lusitu where 
conditions differed most from the resettlers’ previous habitat. Not only was the Lusitu 
inhabited by a host population belonging to a different ethnic group and speaking a 
different language, but they lived in a land that the resettlers believed was a ‘killing field’ 
because of its many cemeteries and sparse living population. The many deaths from 
dysentery and the mystery disease in late 1958 and during 1959 provided confirmation of 
that belief. Gwembe Tonga fears may also have been exacerbated by archaeological 
investigations during 1960-62 of an early iron age site that was found in one 
neighborhood during the construction of a water storage tank. During excavation, 40 
bodies in close proximity were found. 
Not only did frequent deaths during the initial period of resettlement make it difficult to 
complete appropriate funeral ritual, but the Goba, with different rituals, told the resettlers 
that they must stop their distinctive funeral drumming and wailing because it offended 
the spirits of the land (Scudder and Colson, 1982: 141). Tonga uncertainty about how to 
behave also delayed the reconstruction of lineage shrines necessary for propitiating the 
ancestors, and the building of hunting shrines. It is hard for an outsider to imagine the 
impacts of such a situation. So unsure of how to behave, the resettlers initially sought out 
Goba diviners to explain the causes of misfortune since they were unsure if the skills of 
their own diviners were transferable.  
Adjusting to Adversity 
In coping with resettlement, a majority of the Gwembe Tonga clung to the familiar 
wherever possible, even to the extent of behaving as if a socio-cultural system was a 
closed system. They were risk-adverse, presumably clinging to the familiar as a way to 
avoid additional change that might increase uncertainty and stress in their lives. Brothers 
and other close kin began resettlement working more closely together than they had 
before removal. Those who had had separate homesteads were apt to rebuild in a single 
expanded homestead. Such kinship solidarity increased throughout the Valley “just prior 
to resettlement as people talked and worked on kinship matters…Spectacular 
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reconciliations appear to have been the order of the day, soon to be given even more solid 
recognition in the form of new homestead alignments” (Colson, 1971: 72). 
House types were transferred without change, with resettlers rejecting administration 
suggestions that they build better houses and otherwise “develop” their villages. They 
replied that it was better to build in easily replaced materials so that homesteads could be 
shifted as circumstances required. Explaining this viewpoint to Colson in 1963, one elder 
said he told the administration in the late 1950s “We shall live as we are accustomed to 
live following our own laws…Here a man builds as he wishes, and within his homestead 
he follows his own law. We do not want your regulations. We do not want your 
assistance” (Colson, 1971: 173).  
Agricultural techniques were also transferred without change, with the resettlers initially 
emphasizing regaining their former self-sufficiency. For most that took at least eighteen 
months during which homesteads were rebuilt and fields cleared and planted that were 
large enough to adequately house and feed homestead residents. Adequate rain fell during 
the 1959/60 season. For many resettlers March-June 1960 harvests brought the necessary 
self-sufficiency for the first time since removal. 
In the Lusitu, Gwembe Tonga resettlers adjusted existing customs to interact with Goba 
hosts and to the land. The best alluvial soils were under Goba tenure. Due to the sparse 
Goba population and the absence of cattle for plowing prior to the tsetse control 
operations, much of that land was uncultivated.  Sticking to the familiar, prominent 
Tonga men and women used the customary bondfellow (bulongwe) relationship to gain 
access to such lands in exchange for plowing the fields of their Goba “friends.”  As for 
altering the perception that the land was bad, that was the accomplishment of  a Tonga 
spirit medium living in one of the resettled villages. He claimed that it was not the land 
that was bad, but malevolent people living in the land. Furthermore, claiming possession 
by a new spirit (mangelo or angel) of Lusitu origin (but unknown to the Goba) he said 
that he could counter the witchcraft of such malevolent people as well as cure barrenness 
and insanity. Several miraculous cures, including birth of twins to a Mazulu woman who 
had formerly been barren, helped convince resettlers that his interpretation was correct 
and that the effects of witchcraft could be detected and nullified (Scudder, 1968: 173-74). 
In the years that followed other Lusitu healers claimed possession by mangelo and the 
ability to successfully treat witchcraft victims. Drawing on Tonga concepts of spirit 
medium, possession dance (masabe), and divination (kusonde), the mangelo cult 
subsequently spread throughout the Valley. By 1965, Colson’s Lusitu informants no 
longer considered Lusitu death rates to be higher than those prior to resettlement. By then 
the large majority also stated an unwillingness to return to their former village sites even 
if Kariba Lake should empty. 
It would be wrong, however, to leave the impression that resettlers were totally unable to 
respond in new ways to new conditions and opportunities. Gaining access to the land of a 
different ethnic group in the Lusitu was an innovation though one based on a customary 
procedure. The same was true of the mangelo cult where “a familiar institution (spirit 
possession) was modified by drawing on Christian beliefs to deal with a new situation” 
(Scudder, 1993: 143). There, as elsewhere throughout the Valley, a minority of resettlers 
also responded quickly to the opportunity to fish commercially the new reservoir. On the 
other hand, the organization of fishing operations was based on familiar kinship patterns.  
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While the administration had hoped to form fishing cooperatives and a strong fishers 
organization, the social organization of the fishery continued to be kin-based – a common 
pattern being a senior kinsmen advancing a younger relative the capital to acquire the 
necessary equipment. Should the fishing operation prosper other kin would be recruited 
to assist, with the most successful then establishing themselves in the same way. As for 
life in the fish camps, there too both resettlers and hosts grouped themselves, and sold 
their surplus, in customary ways. During 1959, eight fishing camps were established 
along the middle reaches of the reservoir. The largest contained 128 fishers. The camp 
itself stretched along the lakeshore for about three miles with fishers grouping themselves 
according to village and neighborhood. As with basket and pot makers, and practitioners 
of other skills, they expected buyers of any surplus to come to them. 
Stage 3: Economic Development and Cultural Renaissance 
By 1961, the large majority of resettlers had regained their former self sufficiency. By the 
mid-1960s homesteads once again were fissioning in the Lusitu. There resettlers had 
begun to attend Goba beer drinks and funerals. Intermarriage between Tonga and Goba 
was also becoming increasingly common. Between 1962 and the mid-1970s resettlers 
throughout the Valley pioneered a more diversified economy that enabled a majority to 
raise their living standards to a higher level than ever before. During the same time 
period, they enjoyed a period of cultural embellishment which I have characterized 
elsewhere,  with some exaggeration perhaps,  as a cultural renaissance (Scudder, 1993: 
143).  For Colson and myself returning to the Middle Zambezi Valley at this time was a 
joy. I believe three factors were responsible for improving living standards. One, difficult 
to pin down, was psychological. Having survived those most difficult initial years, people 
appear to have realized their potential to cope with, and overcome, hardship. They 
became more willing to experiment. 
Ironically, a second factor was the very reduction in cultural inventory that had proved so 
stressful during the initial years of resettlement. Three examples relate to land tenure, 
leadership and agricultural ritual. Prior to resettlement the better alluvial soils were all in 
use under customary rules of tenure. Even in the bush well inland from the Zambezi, land 
available for pioneering agriculture had become increasingly scarce. Though resettlement 
disadvantaged women because of their dependence on men for land clearance, it provided 
an opportunity for the most enterprising men to acquire new land irrespective of the 
amount of lineage land that they had had access to prior to removal.  
The loss of leadership associated with resettlement also allowed new leadership to arise 
based on experience, enterprise, imagination and education. Waiting for the 
neighborhood ritual leader to initiate agricultural and other livelihood activities was an 
effective way for informing the members of a consumption-oriented egalitarian society 
when key tasks should be carried out in a problem-prone and high risk environment. 
Even before resettlement, however, such rituals were being ridiculed by school boys and 
some young men. Should such ritual have been transferred immediately to the 
resettlement areas it would have provided a constraint to agricultural initiative and 
innovation by those who wished to carry out early planting, for example, or follow the 
advice of the Department of Agriculture and the small number of farmers who had left 
villages for government-inspired agricultural schemes. Though eventually agricultural 
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rituals were re-introduced, by then they were taken less seriously by those involved and 
were not seen as constraining by those who ignored them. 
The third factor was the new opportunities provided by Kariba Lake and the Gwembe’s 
increasing incorporation into a wider political economy. Accompanying social impacts 
and responses were of two very different sorts. One, a blossoming of Tonga culture, 
stressed continuity. The other, an increasing wealth differential and social stratification, 
fostered change through the formation of a class structure with a widening gap between 
the relatively well off and the poor. Education and such commercial activities as fishing, 
sale of cash crops and livestock and small businesses played a particularly important role. 
In 1962, the first stream for Gwembe secondary school students opened at the Monze 
Secondary School on the Plateau. In 1964 students transferred to the newly built  
Chipepo Secondary School on the edge of Kariba Lake. Graduating one year after 
Zambian independence, Gwembe students, and those who followed during the next few 
years, were in an excellent position to fill the new jobs that came with Independence and 
the departure of former colonial civil servants.  
The experience with fisheries development in man-made lakes in the tropics and 
subtropics is for an explosion of productivity to occur during reservoir filling and 
immediately thereafter. In the Kariba case the reservoir did not reach full storage level 
until the 1963 dry season so that the period of highest productivity lasted for over five 
years. Careful planning by the administration meant that the Tonga had the opportunity to 
benefit from that surge of productivity before the reservoir stabilized and productivity 
dropped. 
Fishing was a seasonal activity during the dry season. During the rains, fishers returned to 
their villages to cultivate, a pattern that was encouraged by the Department of Fisheries 
declaring a December-March closed season until the mid-1960s. Between the end of 
1959 and 1962 the number of north bank Gwembe Tonga fishermen had increased from 
407 to over 2,000, with resettlers more actively involved than hosts. During that time 
period, north bank Tonga fishers dispersed over the entire length of the reservoir 
establishing camps along the shoreline and on islands. Fishers distant from markets, built 
under the authority of the District Council, sun-dried and smoked their catch which was 
then either transported to the markets for sale, sold to itinerant traders, or marketed by the 
fisher himself. Caught by over 5,000 gillnets, recorded landings reached 3,000 tons and 
rose to 4,000 tons during 1963. Thereafter productivity began to drop, with landings by 
less than 500 fishers dropping to less than 1,000 tons during 1967. By then fishing had 
become more a subsistence than a commercial activity for the gradually decreasing 
number of fishermen. When the north bank fishery was opened to all Zambians in 1964, 
the proportion of Gwembe Tonga dropped to less than 50 percent of the total. 
During the 1959-1963 period income from fishing for unskilled fishers, who on the 
average owned three nets and rented boat space, approximated that for unskilled wage 
labor (Scudder, 1971: ms). While skilled fishers made significantly more, the large 
majority of all fishers accumulated savings as the cost of living in the fish camps was 
very low (with the Gwembe Tonga’s insatiable consumption of beer of any sort being the 
major expense). Savings were used for a wide range of  consumptive and productive 
activities, as well as for self-financing of marriage at an earlier age than was the case 
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among those farming in the villages. Though women were not actively involved in 
catching fish or mending nets, the fishery also played an important role  in their further 
incorporation  into a market economy. While a few settled in the fish camps or became 
fish traders, the majority came from their villages to sell beer and such agricultural 
produce as eggs, fowl, cereal stables and vegetables. As for fishers, most financed the 
education of relatives. They also purchased cattle, as did many of the relatives whose 
education they financed, as well as such farming equipment as plows and ox-drawn carts. 
Following the colonization of the reservoir’s annual drawdown area with a nutritious 
grass (Panicum repens), the Gwembe Valley became one of the best cattle grazing areas 
in the country. Between 1962 and 1972 herd size more than doubled from 24,000 cattle to 
over 52,000.    In the villages, the large majority of farm families were able to switch 
from hoe cultivation to ox traction which in turn expedited the growing of cash crops 
when the fishery began to decline. Cotton, brewing sorghum, and maize were the 
principle cash crops. In 1963 there were only 43 cotton growers. By the 1966/67 season 
there were over 350 with the total increasing to over 600 in the early 1970s. By then, 
more smallholder cotton was grown in the Valley than in any other Zambian district. 
Capital from fishing also played an important role in funding the proliferation of beer 
halls as well as small general stores for serving an increasing demand for a greater variety 
of consumer goods. Bicycles, transistor radios, and paraffin lanterns were no longer rare. 
Diets were improved with more consumption of animal protein. Improved village 
housing was furnished with folding and other chairs, small tables and spring beds and 
mattresses with blankets and sheets. Kitchen ware improved as did clothing for men, 
women, and children. 
For me, cultural renaissance began one night in 1962 when some Lusitu resettlers re-
commenced funeral drumming. Subsequently “neighbourhood teams of drummers and 
singers not only eclipsed their performances in 1956-57, but were invited to the capital to 
greet political leaders on their return from trips abroad in the years immediately 
preceding and following independence” (Scudder, 1993: 143). In 1965 puberty rituals 
were re-introduced in one Lusitu neighborhood that had practiced them before 
resettlement. In serious drought years agricultural ritual, now involving both Goba and 
Tonga shrines, also reoccurred. Another feature was a proliferation of hunting shrines 
such as I had never observed prior to resettlement. 
Stage 4: Handing Over and Incorporation  
When Colson and I returned to the Valley in 1971, handing over and incorporation had 
begun even before the first children born in resettlement areas had reached their teens. 
While there had never been a specialized resettlement agency to hand over assets to local 
institutions and line government agencies, a special resettlement fund had been 
established in 1960. Earlier the Northern Rhodesian government has submitted a claim to 
the Federal Power Board (FPB) for relocation and development purposes that exceeded 
₤3 million. Following negotiations, ₤2.6 million were agreed upon in August 1960. Of 
that amount nearly half had already been spent, while the District Council had received 
₤200,000 as general compensation.3 Exceeding a million pounds, the remainder was to be 
                                                 
3  At the household level, ₤372,000 were received to cover value of lost housing and other household 
structures as well as loss of agricultural production (Colson 1971: 23). Most cash compensation was 
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paid into a Gwembe Special Fund over a five-year period. Decisions on the Fund’s use 
were made by five trustees, two of whom represented the District Council.  
During 1961, a development program was drawn up for complementing the activities of 
existing government departments by providing funds for additional staff, equipment and 
infrastructure. Activities focused on irrigated and dryland agriculture, tsetse control, the 
Kariba Lake fishery, education, public health and such public works as feeder roads. In 
April 1966 the Fund ceased to exist, with remaining funds handed over to the District 
Council.  
An accelerating rate of development between the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s 
sped up the incorporation of the Valley people into the political economy of newly 
independent Zambia. Increasing emphasis on, and access to, secondary school education 
at the time of independence opened up jobs in the government sector. Though the largest 
number were as primary school teachers in the Ministry of Education, by the 1970s 
Gwembe had also produced its first Government Minister, a university professor and 
senior civil servants  as well as several jet pilots. Serviced by an all-weather, 
macadamized road, Zambia’s first and only coal mines opened in the central portion of 
the Kariba Lake basin during the 1960s.  Along with the commercialization of agriculture 
and fishing, mining accelerated the Valley’s incorporation into the Zambian national 
economy. 
Such development was not sustainable, so that successful movement of the resettlement 
process through Stage 4 has not occurred. Downturn characterized by increasing 
economic impoverishment and social disorganization at the village level began in the 
mid-1970s and has yet to bottom out. Reasons for the downturn were multiple, of which 
resettlement was only one. Adverse international terms of trade were another with the 
price of copper, which provided 80 percent of Zambia’s foreign exchange, dropping at 
the same time during the 1970s that the price of imported oil quadrupled. 1981 reports of 
the International Labour Organization and the World Bank note the devastating economic 
impacts that followed, with the Bank referring to “a prolonged economic slump” (1941: 
4.30) and ILO calling a 52 percent fall in real Gross Domestic Product per head  during 
the 1974-1980 period “an unsought and unenviable record by international standards” 
(1981:3). The more recent AIDS epidemic is also a factor with adult death rates rising 
from the late 1980s to the present. So too is drought, the frequency of drought years 
increasing during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Zambian economy and the Valley were also hard hit by Rhodesia’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in 1965 and by the war for Zimbabwe’s independence 
during the 1970s. At the national level, exports formerly routed to the south had to be 
rerouted to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. As a leader of the Front Line States 
against Rhodesia, Zambia also bore disproportionate costs, including raids by Rhodesian 
forces into Zambian territory. Bordering Rhodesia, the Valley was especially hard hit. 
Controlling Lake Kariba, Rhodesian forces caused the total collapse of the fishery until 
after Zimbabwe’s 1980 independence, while presence of land mines throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                 
probably spent on food during Stage 2 although Colson has case material where it was also spent by  some 
household heads on clothing , educational expenses, and for agricultural and fishing equipment. 
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Valley disrupted government services dealing with education, public health and 
agriculture. With the cessation of tsetse control, mortality among cattle increased to the 
extent that some villagers had to revert back to hoe cultivation. Land mine explosions, as 
well as attacking Rhodesian forces, also killed Gwembe residents, including  people in 
each of Colson’s and my four study communities.  
The major reasons for downturn, however, were government policies since independence. 
In spite of reduced revenue due to the fall in copper prices, Seidman’s analysis indicates 
that the government did not lack the necessary “investable surpluses” after the mid-1970s 
to follow a basic needs investment strategy for the country’s rural majority. But, she 
argues, “necessary institutional changes have not been made to ensure that these 
surpluses are directed to the appropriate expansion of productive sectors” (1979: 107). 
What those surpluses were used for included housing and other subsidies for government 
and parastatal employees, and increases in public sector allowances and salaries. High 
paid officials, for example, “are eligible for…commuted car allowances, entertainment 
allowances, payment of electricity and water bills, the provision of one or two servants 
and a security guards as well as for generous subsistence allowances when traveling 
abroad,” while the “total annual additional cost of the salary rewards…exceeds the sum 
we estimate to be required to meet basic needs in water, health, education and housing 
over the next five years “ (ILO, 1981: 130).  
Though the President of what was then a one party state claimed to be a development 
advocate for Zambia’s more than 500,000 rural households and successive national 
development plans advocated improved national distribution of expenditure, the 
development policies implemented continued to favor the urban-industrial sector.  
According to Simon  “more then 80 percent of productive capital went to the Copperbelt 
and towns along the line of rail” since independence in 1964 (1979:14), while the 1981 
ILO report stated that “in many respects, there has been a deterioration in the proportion 
of total expenditure going to the rural areas, not just a stagnation” (page 7). Hence when 
budget cuts are made they fall “on provincial votes more than headquarters, on district 
votes more than provincial, and on allocation to subdistrict levels heaviest of all. It is the 
periphery that suffers first and gets least” (page 74). Urban bias was also reflected in 
adverse rural-urban terms of trade that had been declining since Independence with “a 
total decline since 1965 of 65 percent (page 7). Such adverse conditions have continued 
under the new 1991 government until the present. According to the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, at 80 percent Zambia has the fourth highest percentage of 
rural poor of 144 developing countries (IFAD, 1993). Estimating rural poverty at 76 
percent in a late 1994 report, the World Bank described it as “more prevalent, deeper and 
more severe than urban poverty” (ii). As for terms of trade, the Bank reported a drop for 
the rural poor “by more than 60 percent over the eighties” (v). 
Turning now to the Gwembe Valley, it can not be argued that people there are worse off 
than in other rural areas of Zambia since available resources vary from one area to 
another. What can be documented, however, is that resettlement has contributed in a 
major way to downturn by crowding resettlers into host areas that are unable to support 
the combined population without serious land degradation. As a result living standards 
have seriously declined from the level achieved between 1962 and the early 1970s. 
 50 
Throughout the valley newly married couples – resettlement’s second generation – were 
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain land to cultivate. Where old fields were 
subdivided by relatives to accommodate them, continued cultivation without fallowing 
reduced fertility and crop yields. Agricultural yields dropped as villagers reverted to hoe 
cultivation after selling off their cattle and plows to purchase food during increasing 
periods of hunger. The remains of bicycles that were functional in the 1960s were now 
apt to be seen hanging in trees while busted spring beds rusted outside houses that were 
no longer being improved. 
In the most densely settled areas, gully, sheet and splatter erosion removed top soil and 
reduced field size. Deforestation along Zambezi tributaries increased flash flooding 
during the rainy season and caused formerly perennial streams to run dry during the latter 
part of the dry season. Widening tributary channels, flash flooding also eroded streamside 
alluvial gardens. During the dry season, the Lusitu resembled areas in the West African 
Sahel immediately below the Sahara desert as wind-swept barren land expanded as the 
years went by.  
Deteriorating economic conditions were accompanied by community unraveling. Alcohol 
abuse among men increased and spread to women. Assault, murder, and suicide increased 
within the most adversely affected communities as did poisoning and maiming of a 
neighbor’s domestic animals. Theft increased not just within communities but within 
households with children stealing cattle and other livestock from their parents and 
matrilineal kin (Cliggett and Colson, manuscript).  Rather than blaming the government 
and government policies for their misfortunes, villagers blamed the jealousy and 
witchcraft of their neighbors, with fathers now identified as witches for the first time 
(Colson, 2000) and perhaps even mothers. As a belief system based on the ancestors as 
the controlling influence in people’s lives waned, it was replaced by a belief system in 
which witchcraft, for the first time, was the dominant component.  
Though the increasing prominence of witchcraft beliefs and accusations is a major 
characteristic of declining living standards, other Gwembe Tonga responses have been 
more positive. Especially important has been out-migration from the most densely settled 
and degraded areas throughout the Valley to other rural locations with a higher 
agricultural potential. Within the Valley, individual homestead have broken off from 
villages to colonize the edge of Kariba Lake so that today homesteads and small hamlets 
can be found from one end of the reservoir to the other. There utilization of the 
drawdown area for the cultivation of maize and other crops plays a key role in helping 
people survive as does fishing and the grazing of livestock within the drawdown zone.  
Outside the Valley, thousands of Gwembe Tonga have initiated the pioneer and difficult 
settlement of sparsely populated land on the Plateau where arable soils had yet to be 
farmed because of such factors as isolation, tsetse fly infestation and inadequate water 
supplies and social services.  In both the Valley and pioneer areas, formation of a wide 
range of village and neighborhood committees has potential for eventually reversing 
community decline. In pioneer settlement areas such committees involve men and women 
over wide areas who are organizing to bring roads, water supplies, and school and clinics 
to their communities. In Valley villages they involve school, food distribution, 
reforestation, sport, and other activities. More controversial, but important as a substitute 
for, and protection against, witchcraft, is the increasing membership in a growing number 
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of fundamentalist Christian churches such as the New Apostolic and Faith Apostolic 
churches. 4 
Current Efforts at Resettlement Rehabilitation 
The Coming of Age of Reparation? 
Once again current activities resulting from Kariba’s construction over 40 years ago 
provide an opportunity to advance knowledge about resettlement issues. In this case the 
issue concerns reparations for resettlers impoverished by poorly planned and 
implemented resettlement. While the Coville Confederated Tribes had claimed 
reparations in 1951 due to their resettlement in the 1940s in connection with the Grand 
Coulee Dam (WCD 2000, 128), the United State’s government’s agreement to pay was 
delayed until the mid-1990s. By then the Government of China already had begun 
initiating a reparations policy for the 383,000 people who had been inadequately resettled 
between the mid-1960s and the 1970s when the Danjiankou Dam had been constructed 
on a Yangtze River tributary. Two Chinese policies with important global implications 
were pioneered during the 1980s. The first was to set aside a fixed percentage of the 
revenue from the sale of electricity for the benefit of resettlers.  The second was to 
establish a “remaining problems fund” to further facilitate development activities (CYJV, 
1988). Subsequently, in 1986, the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power 
initiated a program for the rehabilitation of some 5 million resettlers in 46 resettlement 
areas (WCD, 2000: 129).  
While China’s “remaining problems fund” associated with Danjiankou resettlement may 
be the first major attempt by a government to correct resettlement deficiencies, Kariba’s 
Gwembe Tonga Rehabilitation and Development Program (GTRDP) is the first to be 
funded by international donors. From such precedents, the November 2000 final report of 
the World Commission on Dams states that “There is an increasing number of examples 
of reparations being made for past inequities.” While that is an important step forward, 
with the exception of China, the issue of reparations continues to be dealt with on an 
inadequate ad hoc, case by case, basis. Kariba, along with cases involving Native 
Americans in the United States, is an example. Until donors and borrowers develop more 
inclusive international and national policies, inadequate attention will continue to be paid 
to procedures for addressing the reparations issue. 
The Kariba Case: Reparations on the Zambian Side 
The inauguration of the Gwembe Tonga Rehabilitation and Development Project 
(GTRDP) in December, 1998 was due to a unique series of circumstances which cannot 
be expected to produce similar efforts elsewhere. In 1995, a World Bank mission was in 
Zambia appraising a major project for the rehabilitation of Zambia’s electricity sector that 
overlapped with one of my revisits to the Gwembe Valley. The terms of reference for that 
Mission also included assessing environment and resettlement issues so that future 
projects would comply with World Bank guidelines.  Because the leader of the Bank 
mission was a colleague with whom I had previously worked in Lesotho, I invited him 
                                                 
4  Still more recent is the arrival of Baptist missionaries from the United States (Colson, personal 
communication). 
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and his team to visit the Lusitu area where several members of our research team were 
resident. Two visits followed, with the second including the Managing Director of the 
Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) which was to be the implementing 
agency for what subsequently was funded by the World Bank as the $215 million Power 
Rehabilitation Project. 
Members of the Bank Mission, as well as the ZESCO official, were appalled by the 
environmental degradation and poverty that they saw and for which they realized 
Kariba’s construction bore a major responsibility. An ecologist, one member estimated 
that it would take the Lusitu area 40 years to recover IF there were no people living there! 
Following their visits, I was requested to write a review of the situation that would 
include possible development scenarios for raising living standards. Meanwhile the 
World Bank Mission recommended that the proposed Power Rehabilitation Project (PRP) 
now include, as an add-on, a rehabilitation component for Kariba resettlers. After ZESCO 
agreed to be responsible for such an effort, I assisted in writing the terms of reference for 
a planning study. Two novel components drawn from my earlier review were “a reservoir 
level forecasting system to provide village level data” to improve the timing of 
previously risky agricultural activities in the drawdown area and a “land use and resource 
assessment of Gwembe Tonga spontaneous relocation areas” (World Bank, Annex 5, 
1995: 2-3). The second component was intended to facilitate the sustainable development 
of the major pioneer settlement area on the plateau to which thousands of Gwembe Tonga 
were migrating. Both were incorporated within the Power Rehabilitation Project. The key 
component in the Gwembe portion, however, was the rehabilitation of the Bottom Road 
(Figure 1). Formerly connecting villages from one end of Gwembe Valley to the other, 
and essential for marketing village produce, portions had become impassable during the 
war years. 
In January 1997, the Institute for Economic and Social Research (INESOR) of the 
University of Zambia was contracted to carry out the planning study. Though funded by 
the World Bank, ZESCO had appointed an excellent GTRDP manager. This was Claire 
Limbwambwa who made an important contribution to the study. Using a local research 
organization was important and INESOR put together a team of university researchers 
and experienced senior officials from relevant government departments. Though a 
number of members spoke Tonga, a team weakness was its failure to incorporate any of a 
number of good Gwembe Tonga scientists.  At my insistence, this constraint was partially 
corrected by using World Bank funds that had been set aside for my involvement as an 
adviser to recruit Bennett Siamwiza -- a resettler and lecturer at the University who had 
written his master’s dissertation on the history of famine in Chief Mwemba’s area. 
ZESCO also appeared to have a bias against using Gwembe Tonga professionals. Though 
I suspect a political factor to be involved, the main reason may be influenced by the 
example of international donors to not use host country personnel – a policy which I am 
convinced seriously weakens project planning and implementation.  
Titled Development Strategies and Rehabilitation Programmes for the People Affected by 
the Construction of the Kariba Dam: Proposed Implementation Plan (Vol. 1) and Final 
Composite Report (Vol. 2), INESOR’s final report was submitted to the World Bank in 
December 1997. Covering the topics in the terms of reference, it provided the necessary 
information for the World Bank’s appraisal document (Report No. 17019-ZA) for the 
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Power Rehabilitation Project.  That allocated approximately 5 million dollars to five 
activities as follows: 
 “(a) the rehabilitation of 365 km of a key road (‘the Bottom Road’) that connects 
the three districts  that have received the resettled people; (b) water resource development 
combining improved water supply  and improving cropping patterns along the margins of 
the reservoir that are timed to coincide with the patterns of reservoir drawdown and 
refilling; (c) improvement of land use through strengthening agricultural extension 
facilities. In addition, a fund is to be created to support micro-projects dealing with land 
use; (d) upgrading of health facilities and services; and (e) electrification of three of the 
large villages (Chipepo, Gwembe Boma and Sinazeze), as well as the area around the 
reservoir” (World Bank, 1997: 12).  
At the Zambian end, funding would come through ZESCO, the intention being that 
eventually an electricity surcharge would provide funds for past and future resettlement 
activities as is currently the case in China.  For international finance, a separate project 
account in ZESCO’s parent ministry would be required, with funds coming through the 
World Bank’s International Development Agency ($0.5 million) and the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa ($4.5 million). Located in South Africa, the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (DBSA) would also be actively involved in project supervision as 
well as the financing for the Bottom Road. Claire Limbwambwa would head up a field-
based project management unit under a steering committee to be co-chaired by the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Energy and Water Development and “a nationally 
prominent” Gwembe Tonga (ibid, Annex 12: 5). 
 
The Gwembe Tonga Rehabilitation and Development Program was inaugurated at 
Siavonga in December 1998 for a three year period. All seven Gwembe chiefs were 
present along with the Gwembe’s three members of parliament.   The introductory speech 
was given by Professor Mwindaace Siamwisa – both a Gwembe Tonga resettler and a 
leading Zambian scientist. The next month tragedy struck. An exploding landmine killed 
an expatriate consultant surveying the rehabilitation of the Bottom Road.  That set back 
the entire project, with the Zambian army only completing an expensive program of de-
mining during 2003. Bureaucratic delays within DBSA, however, must also share 
responsibility for delayed project implementation, with effectiveness of their loan 
delayed until the end of 2001. By then depreciation of the South African currency meant 
that loan funds would suffice only for the design of the Bottom Road. That was poorly 
supervised, with the contractor misusing what were already inadequate funds by 
producing a more expensive design that was poorly suited to Gwembe conditions. I 
believe that the World Bank must share some of the responsibility here because, as the 
main donor for the Power Rehabilitation Project, the Bank should have retained 
responsibility for the design and implementation of the most important component of the 
Gwembe Tonga Rehabilitation and Development Project. That responsibility should have 
included more financial resources as opposed to relying on DBSA as the main 
international donor and more professional supervision through use of the Bank’s social 
science expertise. 
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Though the World Bank extended the project for another two years when it ended in 
December 2002 and contributed another $2.5 million, available funding continued to be 
inadequate for essential Bottom Road reconstruction. As a result of de-mining and 
inflated road design costs, budget estimates had increased from $12.3 million at appraisal 
to nearly $110 million based on the government’s assessment. Other implementation 
problems responsible for unsatisfactory results to date were institutional. One arose from 
the add-on status of the Gwembe Tonga component which I believe, as noted above, led 
the World Bank to commit inadequate supervisory staff from its Social Group. 
Inadequate political will on the part of the government and local politics were another 
factor. From the start local politicians tried to influence project staffing by having 
unqualified supporters recruited as the three GTRDP local liaison officers. Appointment 
of expensive international staff also was delayed by the World Bank’s international 
competitive bidding requirements. Were recruitment was completed, in some cases 
agencies contracted to complete various components had re-assigned key personnel 
because of delayed receipt of funds. In the meanwhile a well-equipped office was opened 
in Siavonga, new vehicles were provided for the liaison officers, and a radio program 
began advertising the expected benefits of the project.  Soon my colleagues and I began 
getting letters and reports from research assistants and Gwembe villagers complaining 
about project vehicles moving about but doing nothing and a radio program trumpeting 
benefits but unable to announce achievements. 
Some important results, however, had been achieved by the end of 2004. Perhaps most 
important was de-mining of the Bottom Road which most likely would not have occurred 
without the GTRDP project. Electrification had been extended to the Chipepo Secondary 
School and Chipepo Harbor area as well as to community clinics and other schools. The 
main clinic serving the harbor area was being renovated with four smaller clinics being 
built elsewhere in the Valley. At least 19 of 30 tube wells planned under the project had 
completed, while a school and clinic were being built in the main plateau pioneer 
settlement area to which Gwembe Tonga were migrating, and efforts were underway 
there to improve water supplies. Little, however, has been accomplished that could 
increase local production and improve household incomes. And unless funds are found to 
improve the bottom road not just marketing problems will remain but broader problems 
of access to and from Gwembe villages. 
 
The extent to which further efforts will be made to address results which were 
unsatisfactory at the time the two year extension ended at the end of 2004 remains to be 
seen. Efforts on the part of the Government of Zambia, the World Bank and DBSA to 
address outstanding problems continue with a joint World Bank-DBSA mission planned 
for April-May 2005. A further extension remains a possibility. More specifically, DBSA 
has agreed to use remaining funds to improve the central portion of the bottom road that 
connects Chipepo Harbour with the rest of Zambia.      
 
Reparations on the Zimbabwe Side 
My original hope was that a binational rehabilitation and development project could have 
been launched in which the joint Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) would have been the 
key agency working together with relevant Zambian and Zimbabwean institutions. 
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Preceding a July 1996 ZRA-sponsored workshop at Kariba Town, a team of nine ZRA 
staff, including ZRA’s Chief Executive, Michael Tumbare, completed a one and a half 
month survey of resettlement areas on both sides of the reservoir. Their June 1996 draft 
report, titled Kariba Dam’s Operation Noah Re-Launched, emphasized the need for a 
$142 million project what would attempt to rescue the Gwembe Tonga in the same way 
that the original Operation Noah had rescued thousands of animals from drowning at the 
time of inundation. With the foreword written by Zambia’s Minister of Energy and Water 
Development and Zimbabwe’s Minister of Transport and Energy, the signs for a joint 
approach to rehabilitation and development looked good.  
Terms of reference for a binational Gwembe Tonga study were discussed in detail during 
the July workshop. As well as the Gwembe Tonga component of Zambia’s Power 
Rehabiltation Study, they included the Gwembe Tonga in Zimbabwe, with the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) to play a role similar to ZESCO’s. Overall scope of 
the study was expanded to include “collation of ecological data downstream of Kariba 
Dam and assessment of effects of downstream biophysical changes on the Lower 
Zambezi River to Mozambique.”  The budget for a two-year study to start in January 
1997 was estimated at $385,000. Willing to take on sponsorship and to be involved in 
whatever development program resulted, ZRA circulated the draft terms of reference 
within a fortnight.  
Though no funding sources were mentioned aside from the ZRA’s Zambezi Valley 
Development Fund to be financed primarily by a one percent fee on water used for 
generating electricity (Tumbare, 1999), and the possibility of a levy on revenue from sale 
of electricity, the assumption by myself as well as others in Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
including the ZRA’s Chief Executive, was that the World Bank would be a major donor. 
Such was not to be, however, with momentum stopping when Bank officials decided to 
restrict their contribution to the Gwembe Tonga component of Zambia’s Power 
Rehabilitation Project.  
I fault the World Bank for losing a major opportunity to show its commitment to 
environment and resettlement issues by addressing serious defects relating to its first 
major dam project. I also fault the World Bank for its unwillingness to support the 
initiative of the Zambezi River Authority to expand its responsibilities to include the 
environment and affected people both within the reservoir basin and downstream. Should 
the proposed study have been carried out, it might very well have led to a program of 
environmental flow releases prior to the February-March 2000 and 2001 floods which 
could have reduced loss of life in Mozambique and loss of millions of dollars worth of 
crop and other damages throughout the Lower Zambezi Basin and the lower portion of 
the Middle Zambezi. In turn, such a study could also have been internationally precedent 
setting, including advancing the cause for environmental flow releases from 
Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa Dam. 
Major Lessons Learned 
 
1. Mainstream dams on major rivers like the Zambezi should be built, if at all, only 
as a last resort for meeting essential development goals. Though a careful consideration 
of alternatives might well have favored the hydro-electric option under Central African 
conditions, at the time a tributary dam in the Kafue Gorge would have met Copperbelt 
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and Southern Rhodesian needs with much reduced environmental and social costs.  
Consideration of a wider range of options thereafter may or not have led to a mainstream 
dam.  
 
2. Generally speaking, larger dams should be planned and implemented as multi-
purpose rather than as single purpose projects. In the Kariba case, the omission of 
irrigation was a serious deficiency since the irrigation potential of land below the dam on 
both sides of the river had already been established. But because planning was the 
exclusive prerogative of government agencies interested only in energy production, no 
wider planning occurred before the decision was made to proceed with Kariba.  
 
3. Major costs of mainstream dams, yet to be adequately dealt with by planners even 
today,  are downstream environmental and social costs. Where incorporated within a 
multi-criteria analysis through adequate environmental, health and social impact 
assessments, I would suspect such costs to have precluded the construction of  a good 
number of existing mainstream dams, or, at the very least, have required significant 
environmental flow releases and greatly improved resettlement outcomes. As Kariba was 
designed, environment flows – though never released to date – require nearly full 
reservoir levels.  Cahora Bassa, on the other hand, is designed for such releases which 
current research indicates should be incorporated within dam operations for the benefit of 
downstream habitats, the delta in particular, and communities.  
 
4. While the timing of environmental flows should attempt to reflect natural 
conditions to the extent possible, an effort should also be made to use them to improve 
conditions for cultivation of the reservoir drawdown area. The overall goal should be to 
approximate natural conditions by simulating the equivalent of a one to five year flood as 
frequently as possible. To avoid the type of uncertainty that characterized the operation of 
the Kariba Dam during the 1960s and more recently, the timing of dam safety work 
involving flow releases should also reflect, to the extent possible, impacts on downstream 
and reservoir users. This is not a problem unique to Kariba, a more recent example being 
where operators at the Manantali Dam on the Senegal River made unnecessarily ill-timed 
releases at the expense of hundreds of thousands of downstream users (Adams, 1999). 
 
5. Budgeting for resettlement as a project cost requires detailed pre-project 
demographic, health and socio-economic “baseline” surveys. Though Kariba resettlement 
was considered a project cost, budgeting was based on totally inadequate information on 
the number of future resettlers as well as consideration of their needs and rights. As 
formulated and implemented, the Federal Power Board’s mere “restoration of living 
standards” policy was responsible for the further impoverishment of the large majority of 
resettlers on both sides of the Zambezi as well as for the degradation of the major 
resettlement areas. 
 
6. As now required by multilateral donors, a resettlement plan must be prepared 
during the period of feasibility studies and approved before a decision is made to 
commence construction. In the Kariba case, serious resettlement planning was delayed 
until after construction began. Because less than three years was a totally inadequate 
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planning period, resettlement became a crash program to evict resettlers from the future 
reservoir basin before the dam was sealed.  
 
7. Based on the Kariba experience, as well as that of such subsequent large dams as 
Ghana’s Volta Dam at Akosombo, Egypt’s Aswan High Dam, India’s Sardar Sarovar 
Dam, and Lesotho’s Highlands Water Project, construction and resettlement schedules 
must be synchronized. As defined, synchronization requires not just physical removal to 
completed housing, but also provision of adequate water and sanitation facilities, such 
social services as schools and health facilities, and  initial implementation of 
development opportunities for raising living standards. 
  
8. Far more attention should be paid in resettlement planning to development 
opportunities for raising resettler and host living standards. Still frequently neglected , 
such opportunities should include fishing the reservoir and utilizing the reservoir 
drawdown area for the benefit of project affected people as opposed to more experienced, 
politically connected  and capitalized immigrants.  
 
9. Because a successful resettlement outcome can be expected to take time, donor 
policy guidelines should require post resettlement monitoring as well as further  
assistance in the event that guideline requirements are not being met. Kariba provides an 
excellent example of the need for such monitoring, re-evaluation and further project 
assistance. According to the World Bank’s Profiles of Large Dams, “there is evidence 
…of an improvement in the standard of living” as an impact of resettlement (1996:82)! 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 
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